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ABSTRACT  
Health care reform is once again in the air. Virtually all 
Democrats favor some meaningful expansion of public insurance, 
whether through single payer or the creation of a “public option” that 
would allow consumers dissatisfied with the private market to buy into 
a public program. Republicans, not surprisingly, have pushed back, 
not only against single payer, but also against the public option, 
saying it will drive private payers to extinction. All the political 
jousting implicates a larger and serious policy question; namely, what 
should be the role of private payers in the nation’s health care system? 
Arguments to date on that subject have largely overlooked two 
crucial realities. First, payers (public and private) perform multiple 
functions regarding health care delivery. That the government is 
better at one function does not mean, or even imply, that the 
government is better at all of them. By disaggregating the services 
payers render in connection with health care financing, debates about 
the ideal roles for public and private payers—as well as whether one 
of them will or should compete the other into extinction—can be had 
on understandable terms. 
Second, although frequent references to the competitive virtues 
of a public option have been made, insufficient thought has been given 
to the conceptual specifics of why and how private payers faced with 
a public option might evolve. In terms of improving care delivery, 
observers have underexamined how private payers might serve as 
welfare-enhancing big data digesters, care evaluators, choice 
intermediaries, and incentive innovators—all proficiencies that not 
only rate to improve the cost and quality of care, but are entirely 
harmonious with modern experience about where private actors often 
 
  Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; J.D. Harvard 
Law School; A.B. Stanford University. I would like to thank Peter Siegelman, Brian 
Galle, John Cogan, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Miguel de Figueiredo, and Carly 
Zubrzycki for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. Note to readers: this Article 
was written prior to (1) the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) the 2020 presidential 
election. I did not meaningfully update the Article after those two events. 
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create value: by collecting, analyzing, packaging, presenting, and 
deploying information.  
Once these two significant theoretical refinements are brought 
to bear, a richer analysis of the public–private question emerges—one 
that supplies good reason to doubt that private payers should or will, 
at least in the short term, be put to the sword by either Congress or 
public-option-armed consumers.  
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Health care reform is once again in the air. Virtually all 
Democrats favor some meaningful expansion of public insurance, 
whether through single payer or the creation of a “public option” that 
would allow consumers dissatisfied with the private market to buy into 
a public program.1 Republicans, not surprisingly, have pushed back, 
not only against single payer, but also against the public option, saying 
it will drive private payers to extinction.2  
 
 1. See, e.g., Peter Sullivan, Democrats Spar over Electoral Appeal of 
‘Medicare for All,’ HILL (Sept. 14, 2019, 2:10 PM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/461383-democrats-spar-over-electoral-appeal-
of-medicare-for-all [https://perma.cc/L3F5-69UU]. Senator Sanders, for example, 
favors a “Medicare for All” approach and envisions a health care system free of 
private payers. See id. Mayor Buttigieg, in contrast, favors a “Medicare for All Who 
Want It” public option approach where anyone unhappy with the private market can 
buy into Medicare. See Scott Simon & Heidi Glenn, ‘Just the Right Policy’: Pete 
Buttigieg on His ‘Medicare for All Who Want It’ Plan, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 8, 
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/08/774716877/just-the-right-policy-
pete-buttigieg-on-his-medicare-for-all-who-want-it-plan [https://perma.cc/LK67-
C2C5]. 
 2. Among those Republicans is Seema Verma, the Administrator of the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. See Seema Verma, I’m the Administrator 
of Medicaid and Medicare. A Public Option Is a Bad Idea., WASH. POST (July 24, 
2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-public-option-for-
health-insurance-is-a-terrible-idea/2019/07/24/fb651c1a-ae2e-11e9-8e77-
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All the political jousting implicates a larger and serious policy 
question; namely, what should be the role of private payers in the 
nation’s health care system?3 Arguments to date on that subject have 
largely overlooked two crucial realities.  
First, payers (public and private) perform multiple functions 
regarding health care delivery. That the government is better at one 
function does not mean, or even imply, that the government is better 
at all of them. By disaggregating the services payers render in 
connection with health care financing, debates about the ideal roles for 
public and private payers—as well as whether either of them will or 
should compete the other into extinction—can be had on 
understandable terms. 
Second, although frequent references to the competitive virtues 
of a public option have been made, insufficient thought has been given 
to the conceptual specifics of why and how private payers faced with 
a public option might evolve. In terms of improving care delivery, 
observers have underexamined how private payers might serve as 
welfare-enhancing big data digesters, care evaluators, choice 
intermediaries, and incentive innovators—all proficiencies that not 
only rate to improve the cost and quality of care, but are entirely 
harmonious with modern experience about where private actors often 
create value: by collecting, analyzing, packaging, presenting, and 
deploying information.  
Once these two significant theoretical refinements are brought to 
bear, a richer analysis of the public–private question emerges—and 
one that supplies good reason to doubt that private payers should or 
will, at least in the short term, be put to the sword by either Congress 
or option-armed consumers. And there is an additional satisfying 
consequence of thickening and stratifying the framework with which 
we assess the optimal role of private players: Doing so allows us to 
more readily locate non-health arguments in favor of continued 
private participation, rationales that may transcend a future empirical 
verdict about the degree to which, or whether, private payers improve 
care or not. 
The ultimate conclusion one reaches about optimal private payer 
participation will, in significant part, turn on one’s priors as well as 
what empirical research one chooses to credit. But that does not mean 
 
03b30bc29f64_story.html [https://perma.cc/6C22-4TX4] (“[T]he public option is a 
Trojan horse with single-payer hiding inside.”).  
 3. Private payers can be traditional insurers, but they can also be employers, 
HMOs, physician associations, or other organizations. For convenience, I use payer 
and insurer interchangeably throughout.  
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consideration of the question need be hopelessly diffuse and 
freewheeling. This Article seeks to structure that debate and propose 




Part I sets the stage.4 No fruitful discussion can occur without 
recognizing that private payers perform multiple functions with 
respect to health care delivery. We can categorize those functions in 
any number of ways, but one particularly useful way is to think about 
the risk, cost, and quality of care. Risk refers to who pays; cost refers 
to how much; and quality refers to care effectiveness. Payer behavior 
implicates all three. To assess whether the government should or will 
replace private payers, one should analyze whether the government is 
better with regard to all those aspects or just some. If the former is 
true, then the clock is ticking on private payers. If not, then regulators 
should take note of the areas in which private payers can serve 
welfare-enhancing ends. 
Part II considers risk.5 A tour of American health care history 
reveals that the United States has settled upon a clear risk strategy with 
respect to the private market. Make the insurable unit a group—
whether a workplace group (ERISA) or the community group 
(ACA)—and charge individuals a premium based upon the average 
risk within that group. The American polity almost certainly settled on 
that approach because either out-of-pocket financing or 
individualized-risk financing would have excluded a majority of 
people from accessing care. In contrast, if one is charged a premium 
that corresponds to the average group member risk, many more can 
afford insurance, and thus care. Nor, obviously, does Medicare care 
about individualized risk; it is financed through broad-based taxes.  
But if the Nation’s private risk strategy is to insure a group and 
charge individuals the group premium, observers asked: Why use 
private players at all? The government could pursue the same 
approach by making the insurable group the entire country and 
“charge” the average cost to every taxpayer. Indeed, as Section II.B 
explains, in terms of risk bearing, the government has enormous 
advantages over private players—and that is reason enough to justify 
a “public option.”6 Were private payers only offering a risk-bearing 
 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Section II.B. 
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service, it is hard to see how they could do better than the government. 
That reality is something, interestingly, that both “Medicare for All” 
advocates and Republican opponents of “Medicare for All Who Want 
It” stress: the former to justify the elimination of private payers, and 
the latter to argue that a public option will cause private players to go 
extinct.7 
Part III explains why the ideal role of private payers, and their 
ultimate fate, defies a sound-bite answer.8 Whatever the government 
advantage regarding risk, on cost and quality of care, the verdict is less 
clear. Part of the challenge arises because both private and public 
payers offer the same promise to their insureds; namely, that 
“medically necessary” care will be provided. This promise—made for 
reasons of both moral and cognitive appeal—leaves unsolved, and 
likely exacerbates, the challenge of minimizing costs, maximizing 
quality, and making tradeoffs in between. 
Part IV considers the potential virtues of private payers on cost 
and quality, particularly when faced with a public option.9 First, 
private payers can promote safety and quality in ways the government 
is unlikely to, and consumers may be willing to pay for that service. 
Second, private payers are more likely to adopt explicit cost-
effectiveness metrics in the insurance promise, which would have 
positive effects for both individuals and society at large. More 
generally, it seems highly unlikely that the very hard problem of 
optimizing health care delivery will be solved if the federal 
government alone is pursuing solutions; private payers can engage in 
helpful data deployment and paradigm experimentation. Third, private 
payers can serve to fund a cross-subsidy for better health care, hold 
information some do not wish the government to have, and serve as 
the alternative option for those philosophically opposed to larger 
government.  
In Part V, I consider objections and concede some ground.10 
Payers will seek rents; they may be worse at innovating than is hoped; 
and even the best result might be a tiered system of care. But those 
downsides, although meaningful, can likely be ameliorated with 
thoughtful regulatory intervention. Finally, I note that keeping 
available the “private option” is not only the superior political strategy 
because it pleases those who are skeptical of a larger government role; 
 
 7. See Sullivan, supra note 1; Simon & Glenn, supra note 1; Verma, supra 
note 2; supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See infra Part V. 
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it is also a superior political strategy because it will produce valuable 
information about what works. Either having private payers at the 
table will be welfare enhancing to society or not. Better to preserve 
them until that verdict is clear, particularly when there are sensible 
reasons to be optimistic, and especially if doing so is the price to pay 
for obtaining true universal coverage.  
I. CONCEPTUALIZING HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
Health care finance is extraordinarily complicated, and people 
who say otherwise are usually selling something.11 But discussion of 
the details is more fruitful when some organizing principles are 
offered first. The motley nature of the American health care system, 
the rise of the public option, and the ever-present urge to improve 
health care delivery makes disciplined thinking by reformers 
essential—particularly with respect to the role of private payers in the 
American health care future. 
In Part I below, I suggest a conceptual path forward: that we 
assess the optimal role for private payers by thinking about how they 
can affect the risk, cost, and quality of health care, and then by 
identifying the advantages and disadvantages, private actors may have 
vis-à-vis the government.  
A. American Health Care Basics 
As scholars have noted, the United States has simultaneously 
adopted multiple health care delivery systems, depending on one’s 
status.12 The elderly and poor have access to public insurance in the 
 
 11. For example, while Candidate Trump boasted that under his 
administration Americans were “going to have such great healthcare at a tiny fraction 
of the cost, and it is going to be so easy,” President Trump admitted that “[n]obody 
knew that health care could be so complicated.” Compare Tim Hains, Trump: 
Repealing and Replacing Obamacare Is Going to Be “So Easy,” REAL CLEAR POL. 
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/10/25/trump_ 
repealing_obamacare_is_going_to_be_so_easy.html [https://perma.cc/8VCD-
L9ZM], with Graham Lanktree & James Lillywhite, Watch Donald Trump Change 
His Tune from Easy to Difficult on Repealing Obamacare, NEWSWEEK (July 20, 2017, 
12:57 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/easy-difficult-watch-donald-trump-change-
his-tune-repealing-obamacare-639782 [https://perma.cc/8JNZ-MLM3]. 
 12. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the 
Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 282 (2013) (discussing different legal regimes under which 
health care is financed and delivered in the United States). 
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form of Medicare and Medicaid.13 The nonelderly have access to 
private insurance in the form of employment-based (ERISA) or 
exchange-based insurance (ACA).14 Thus, being old, poor, employed, 
or none of the above is what drives what type of health care financing 
arrangement one can obtain, with only a very limited ability to choose 
between options.15 
The so-called public option aimed to change that, by the 
expedient of offering all Americans the opportunity to “buy-in” to 
public insurance (generally Medicare).16 Among the offered rationales 
for the pre-ACA proposal, popularized by Yale political scientist 
Jacob Hacker, were that it would ensure that everyone who wanted 
coverage could have it, while also curbing bad payer behavior by 
making insurance markets more competitive.17  
The public option failed to make it into the ACA.18 Yet 
fascination with the notion of giving each American a choice between 
public and private insurance has grown ever stronger. Indeed, 
whatever the virtues and vices of specific public option proposals 
currently being bandied about, the idea of the public option has 
changed the geography of the health debate. In under ten years, it has 
become roughly the conservative position in Democratic policy 
debates with the more progressive wing of the party now urging the 
abolition or near abolition of private insurance in favor of a single 
payer approach.19 Required more than ever is the development of a 
 
 13. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 101, 
111, 79 Stat. 286, 290, 340–43 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 14. See Maher & Pathak, supra note 12, at 282–84. 
 15. See id. at 282. 
 16. See, e.g., Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of 
the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1117, 1117–19 (2010). 
 17. See id. (tracing the political history of the public option). Discussion of 
the public option’s competitive virtues generally focused on giving consumers an 
option to avoid bad payer behavior, as opposed to comprehensively analyzing the 
specifics of how the option would promote competition, along what lines, and whether 
such competition was salutary or would promote rent-seeking. See id. This Article 
offers a framework that, as they say, fills that gap. 
 18. See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1733, 1751 (2011) (explaining that Congress, in enacting the ACA, rejected both 
the creation of a “Medicare for All” health program and multiple versions of a “public 
option”). 
 19. See Eliminate Private Insurance: Where 2020 Democrats Stand, WASH. 
POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/medicare-for-
all/private-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/VNA7-M3SA] (last visited Nov. 16, 2020).  
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methodical framework to carefully analyze the ideal role of private 
payers. 
B. A Tri-Partite Heuristic 
Conceptually, health care financing arrangements—whether 
called “insurance” or not—have three parties: the insured, the payer, 
and the provider. The insured offers a small sum of money in return 
for care; the payer accepts that money while promising to pay for care; 
and the provider strikes deals with either the insured or the payer in 
connection with diagnosing and offering care.  
The simplest version of such a multilateral arrangement is the 
indemnity fee-for-service model.20 There the payer bears the risk and 
pays for the cost of care, while the provider bears the duty to identify 
the need for and provide effective care.21 That arrangement can get 
considerably more complicated, such that multiple parties share duties 
with respect to risk, cost, and quality. But there is nonetheless a useful 
takeaway, which is that the point of any health care financing 
arrangement is to establish some distribution of responsibility with 
respect to risk, cost, and quality in connection with the ultimate aim 
of delivering care. 
Health care is a fundamentally important good. Optimizing 
health care finance arrangements is therefore a subject about which 
society cares enormously: particularly with respect to who bears the 
risk, how much providers get paid, and how good the provided care is. 
Reliance on ill-conceived arrangements can, among other things, 
exclude too many people from access, result in allocative 
inefficiencies regarding care, and provide care of wildly varying 
quality. We can thus productively evaluate different health care 
financing arrangements—as well as regulatory schemes that promote 
or prohibit them—by asking if the arrangement in question is likely to 
give the “right” parties the “right” amount of responsibility with 
respect to the risk, cost, and quality of care.22  
 
 20. See 22 Ill. Prac. 3d § 23:60 n.1. “Indemnity” simply means the insurance 
payout is based on the size of loss. Non-indemnity insurance is when the payout is not 
based on the loss, such as life insurance. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Cf. Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty 
Years War”: The Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 283, 285 (2004) (“Medical insurance does not just pay for medical care—it 
shapes the medical care delivery system, determines what treatments are developed, 
and formulates our view of what constitutes medical care.”). 
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This analysis will be brought into crisper focus if one imagines, 
as I do in Parts II–V, how private payers might behave in a world 
where a public option has been enacted.  
II. THE RISK OF CARE 
Americans favor markets but not so much as advertised. For a 
certain set of socially desirable goods—i.e., goods most agree make 
society better off if all have access to them—Americans have long 
tolerated, if not applauded, government intervention in the market.23 
Health care, as perhaps the classic example of a socially desirable 
good, is no different.24  
Indeed, even though the fractious American polity has so far 
rejected the level of public financing adopted in other developed 
countries, it has nonetheless greenlit a kludge of massive legislative 
interventions—chiefly Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA, and the ACA—
in order to ensure that medical care is available to more than the very 
few that could pay for it directly. And whatever the intimidating 
intricacies of those colossal schemes, they share the common notion 
that individual risk should be largely removed from the financing 
equation. That acknowledges a fundamental financing reality: that 
asking individuals to directly bear their own expected health costs will 
inevitably leave many—in particular those with high needs—unable 
to afford access to care. The regulatory response has been to price 
health care access at no more than the expected cost of some average 
member of a larger group.  
A. Risk Averaging as Care Access  
The problem of “access” to health care is, in a key sense, a 
secondary one. The antecedent problem, which took most of human 
history to satisfactorily address, was figuring out how to effectively 
treat sick people, as opposed to administering “treatments” that make 
things worse.25 Hence Hippocrates’ time-honored admonition to do no 
 
 23. See Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1257, 1276 (2016) [hereinafter Maher, REBA] (“Such goods are 
commonly held to have special significance because of supra-economic concerns such 
as fairness, opportunity, dignity, compassion, and so on.”).  
 24. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 286 (citing PAUL STARR, 
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 156–57 (1982)) (“In the late 
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harm. So long as medicine was doing more harm than good, figuring 
out how to pay for it was far from pressing. But things began to 
meaningfully change in the nineteenth century.26 A number of 
developments served to situate the practice of medicine as an 
important societal and commercial player in the decades to come.27 As 
health care moved from folk medicine to a science-based approach, 
both consumers and legislators became more interested in its use and 
regulation.28 
Interested consumers buy things, and in the simplest of 
arrangements, a sick person simply pays a doctor out of pocket.29 But 
as medical care became more sophisticated, it was soon apparent that 
not nearly enough people could afford to pay for care out of pocket.30 
And so, the first device the United States (organically) relied on to get 
more people care was a familiar type of contract: insurance.31  
1. Health Insurance 
Health insurance made medical care accessible to more people 
because it is a risk-trading device that smooths the cost obligation: the 
insured accepts the risk of a small, recurring loss that he can afford 
(the premium) in return for the insurer assuming the risk of a large loss 
(the cost of needed care) that the insured would, even if he had saved 
his money, not have been able to afford.32 Ambitious politicians 
realized that the government could perform that same function, but the 
 
1800s, for the first time in history, a patient’s chances of survival were improved by 
seeing a physician and going to a hospital.”).  
 26. See STARR, supra note 25, at 156–57. Starr’s book is the seminal work 
about the history of American health care. 
 27. See id. at 160–62.  
 28. See id. 
 29. See JAN GREGOIRE COOMBS, THE RISE AND FALL OF HMOS: AN 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION 3–6 (2005) (discussing paying for health care 
in the early 1900s); see also William D. White, Market Forces, Competitive 
Strategies, and Health Care Regulation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 137, 141 (2004) 
(explaining that in the early part of the twentieth century, the “vast majority of care 
was purchased directly by consumers out-of-pocket on a fee-for-service basis in the 
private market place”). 
 30. See White, supra note 29, at 143. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 959 (1963). Arrow’s article is essentially the 
foundation of modern health economics. 
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success of the New Dealers in enacting social welfare legislation did 
not include the successful passage of national health insurance.33  
The health insurance device, however, grew in popularity and 
particularly in connection with employment.34 As the nation pulled 
itself out of the Great Depression and readied for and fought World 
War II, an increasingly larger percentage of workers obtained 
insurance through the workplace.35 Indeed, in the post-war years, 
having a good car, a good job, a good home, and a good doctor were 
considered to be the signs of middle-class success, and increasingly 
health insurance became something that employers chose to offer.36 
2. Group Health Insurance 
The rising popularity of employment-based health insurance was 
attributable to something more fundamental than post-war glow.37 A 
group policy makes the insurable unit the group, and insuring a group 
is an easier and less risky task than insuring an individual.38 The reason 
is adverse selection, for which we will take a brief detour.39  
For an insurer to make money, it must accurately “underwrite” 
the risk a would-be insured presents. Underwriting is how insurers 
determine the premium they should charge an insured. To 
oversimplify: insurers have vast stores of data about (1) the risk an 
average member of the community poses and (2) the additional 
increment or decrement of risk that various particular characteristics 
pose, should those characteristics be present in an individual. The 
insurer can accordingly adjust upward or downward what the premium 
 
 33. Supporters of national health insurance have counted among their 
number historical figures observers generally do not associate with big government 
liberalism. See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS 
148 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007) (describing the appeal of a “comprehensive system of 
social insurance”); see COOMBS, supra note 29, at 3–6 (explaining the failure of New 
Deal reformers). 
 34. See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-
Provided Health Insurance, 117 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3–4 (1994). 
 35. See id. at 5. 
 36. Cf. Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health 
Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 
891 (2011) (describing factors, such as unions, contributing to spread of health 
benefits after World War II). 
 37. See id. at 892. 
 38. See Maher, REBA, supra note 23, at 1282.  
 39. See id. 
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should be for a potential insured with certain risk-relevant 
characteristics.40  
But the information available to the insurer is not perfect.41 As a 
result, the insurer will be concerned that a seeker of insurance is doing 
so because he is more likely than average to get sick—and thus make 
a claim—but that the applicant’s ascertainable characteristics will not 
allow the insurer to know that.42 One way the insurer can avoid that 
danger—namely, the risk of writing a premium that is too low given a 
would-be insured’s unascertainable likelihood to consume substantial 
care—is by instead writing policies for a large group of people.43 
Groups of people (that are organized for a reason other than to buy 
insurance) are less likely to pose an adverse selection problem, i.e., 
they are more likely to pose a risk that matches the risk of the average 
community member, for whom insurers have a reliable ability to 
properly risk-price.44 Thus, the rise of employment-based health 
insurance, even prior to meaningful federal regulation on the subject, 
happened because doing so was a way to offer health insurance while 
minimizing the risk of profit-destroying adverse selection.  
3. Medicare 
As should be obvious, the widespread use of employment-based 
insurance to ensure people had access to health care leaves out many, 
in particular the elderly. In response to that problem, Great Society 
reformers created Medicare in 1965, which was simply government 
 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
 42. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing the first 
formal treatment of adverse selection); Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 41 
(explaining the first formal model of adverse selection insurance markets); see also 
Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform 
by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 134 (2011) (explaining adverse 
selection, risk-differentiation, and premium pricing). 
 43. See Maher, REBA, supra note 23, at 1282–84.  
 44. See id.; see also Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual 
Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 28 (2010) 
(noting that adverse selection rarely imperils large, employer-sponsored group 
insurance). 
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health insurance for those sixty-five and over.45 Unlike private 
insurers, the federal government had no need to “underwrite” anybody 
or make any effort to price individual risk. Its aim was to pay for a 
certain level of care for all seniors, and finance that through taxes, on 
the assumption that the latter would pay for the former.  
Thus, while this is a bit of an oversimplification, the two largest 
“devices” the American policymaking community was using to ensure 
access to care—namely, group insurance for workers and public 
insurance for the elderly—both rejected using individualized risk as 
the risk-pricing mechanism. Indeed, after ERISA was enacted in 1974, 
Congress enacted a series of amendments to ensure that, while insurers 
writing employment-based policies could underwrite between 
employee groups—e.g., charging coal mining companies more than 
colleges—they could not underwrite within employee groups.46 
4. Affordable Care Act  
The Affordable Care Act was the final step in abandoning any 
meaningful societal use of risk-differentiation in health care financing. 
For the nonpoor–nonelderly who did not have health insurance 
through the workplace, obtaining health insurance—and thus health 
care—was difficult, precisely because these unaffiliated individuals 
were potentially subject to serious adverse selection concerns. To 
solve that problem, the ACA adopted regulatory measures to 
artificially create—through an underwriting bar, guaranteed access, 
and a mandate to buy insurance—a pool of insureds that was 
sufficiently representative of the community, i.e., not just sick people 
to whom insurers could sell community-rated policies.47  
The fact that the United States had thus moved, in different times 
and settings, away from using individualized risk assessments with 
respect to health care financing led some to suggest that the private 
insurance industry—facially perceived as being solely in the business 
 
 45. See Julian E. Zelizer, How Medicare Was Made, NEW YORKER (Feb. 15, 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/medicare-made 
[https://perma.cc/B2CW-XPKM]. 
 46. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b) (2014); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & 
Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers Under the Affordable Care Act: 
Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 539, 541 (2013) 
(explaining how changes to federal law that protect individuals nonetheless permit 
insurers to “charg[e] higher premiums depending on the health status of the group”). 
 47. See Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 
145 (2017) (explaining ACA reforms to ensure a stable pool). 
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of risk differentiating—was not necessary at all.48 Perhaps the best 
approach, observers noted, would be to have the government insure 
the entire community and simply collect a tax equivalent to the 
average cost of care it decided to provide.49 Let us briefly consider the 
government’s risk advantages. 
B. Government Advantages 
The risk aspect of care itself involves at least two sub-tasks: 
identifying the risk of a potential insured and bearing it. One can 
imagine a world in which society determined that the best way to 
handle the risk of care would be to charge individuals a premium that 
closely matched their individual risk.50 In that world, granular 
underwriting capabilities would be of significant importance and 
private payers—particularly traditional insurers—might have a 
significant advantage, via competition or otherwise, compared to the 
government.  
But that does not resemble the approach the American polity has 
favored, which is to move away from an individualized risk model. In 
that world, where individualized risk assessment is moot and indeed 
poses a threat of cherry-picking, the government has meaningful 
advantages with respect to its ability to serve as the risk-bearer. These 
advantages are well-known, and I will recapitulate them only briefly, 
although one in particular bears some additional emphasis given the 
big data revolution currently overtaking all modern economies. 
1. Risk-Neutral 
First, the government is risk-neutral in that it is indifferent to 
fluctuations around the expected value of any given bet; cost volatility 
is economically irrelevant to a financial actor as large as the United 
States government, even setting aside its ability to tax or print 
 
 48. See, e.g., Scott Detrow & Josh Rogers, On the Trail with Bernie Sanders, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 1, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/30/ 
737495980/on-the-trail-with-bernie-sanders [https://perma.cc/52AS-34JM]. 
 49. See id. 
 50. One theory for doing so is that individuals should be incentivized to 
modify their choices, i.e., eat healthy, exercise, stop smoking, to reduce their 
unhealthy behaviors. Many have challenged that notion as unfair and ineffective. See 
generally Hoffman, supra note 44; Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health 
Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2016).  
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money.51 As a result, the government can likely insure any given risk 
at a lower cost than a private insurer.52  
2. Profit-Neutral 
Second, the government is profit-neutral: not only does it not 
need to make money to continue to perform an insurance function, it 
can lose money to the extent voters believe doing so promotes some 
public interest better than would spending those lost dollars on 
something else. But even voters demanding a budget-neutral public 
insurance operation would be creating a competitor with a distinct 
advantage over its private rivals; namely, one with no need to add a 
profit margin—or, in a public-only world, comparative advertising 
expenses—to its risk-bearing service.53  
3. Risk-Indifferent  
Third, the government is risk-indifferent, which is different than 
risk neutral. By risk-indifferent, I mean that the government 
fundamentally is unconcerned about the risk profile of individuals. It 
cares only about the collective risk of the pool it insures so that it can 
properly determine the taxes it needs to collect.54 But the individual 
risk of a given insured is irrelevant. That is not so for private payers.55 
To the extent they can attract better risks and discourage worse risks 
from buying their product, they stand to make money.56 Only 
regulation neuters that impulse. 
 
 51. See Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 
82 (2016). 
 52. The government’s unique ability to assume risks of immense proportion 
also differentiates it from individual private insurers. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Dobbins, 
Promise, Peril, and Procedure: The Price-Anderson Nuclear Liability Act, 70 
HASTINGS L.J. 331, 341 (2019) (discussing government insurance for nuclear 
accidents).  
 53. Generally speaking, an insurer is going to charge a premium equal to the 
sum of (1) an actuarially fair premium equal to the expected loss of the insured during 
the term, (2) the administrative costs associated with running an insurance business, 
and (3) a profit margin. See 39 Cal. Jur. 3d § 120. The third does not exist for the 
government and the second is lower (in theory) because of scale and the size of the 
government’s pocketbook. 
 54. See COMM. ON EMP.-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS DIV. OF HEALTH CARE 
SERVS., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 178 (Marilyn 
J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993). 
 55. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 134. 
 56. See id. at 134–36 (discussing economic gains from risk classification). 
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The big data revolution makes effective regulation along those 
lines harder.57 As information becomes less costly and the ability to 
analyze information becomes much better, a vastly more granular 
picture of a would-be insured’s risk profile can be developed.58 And 
the power to risk-differentiate is ever-enhanced by the degree to which 
people voluntarily produce, in a noninsurance-application setting, 
information about themselves—whether as an incident to commerce 
or gratuitously via public media sites like Facebook.59  
This sort of risk analysis can largely sidestep attempts to stop it, 
in part because of the use of proxy variables.60 Even where, like with 
the ACA, insurers were sharply regulated in terms of how they could 
explicitly underwrite, shadow underwriting is a continuing risk.61 The 
big data revolution thus burdens regulators with a complicated task to 
the extent that insurers are expected to play a salutary role in health 
care access, as opposed to simply collecting easy money insuring low 
risks. None of these problems, of course, exist when the government 
completely assumes the insurance function.  
The policy consequences as to the government’s risk advantages 
are two-fold. First, the federal government is best situated to tolerate 
bearing the riskiest and most unprofitable insureds; for that reason 
alone, a public option makes sense. Second, were risk bearing alone 
 
 57. See Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 
CONN. INS. L.J. 339, 340 (2014). 
 58. See id. at 340–41, 353 (explaining the promise and peril of big data in 
insurance).  
 59. Indeed, the cultural casualness and frequency with which information is 
handed over or left unguarded, and the ever-improving ability of data scientists and 
machine algorithms to make predictions based on any given set of data, has led to 
routine reports by data researchers about surprising things they can predict about 
people merely from analyzing their “digital exhaust” or other innocuous 
information—including health-related predictions. See, e.g., Johannes C. Eichstaedt 
et al., Facebook Language Predicts Depression in Medical Records, 115 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 11203, 11207 (2018); see also Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing 
Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics Regulation, 98 N.C. L. REV. 123, 133–34 
(2019) (discussing the use of nontraditional information to make medical predictions); 
see also James Vincent, Google’s New AI Algorithm Predicts Heart Disease by 
Looking at Your Eyes, VERGE (Feb. 19, 2018, 12:04 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/19/17027902/google-verily-ai-algorithm-eye-
scan-heart-disease-cardiovascular-risk.  
 60. Cf. Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the 
Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1261–62 (2020) 
(discussing the inevitable use of proxy variables when AI is deployed). 
 61. Cf. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 167–71 (discussing how an 
employer might indirectly risk classify, even under the ACA). 
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the function of private payers, the case for public payers and public 
payers only would be very strong. But that is not the whole story. 
III. THE COST AND QUALITY OF CARE 
Health care payers do more than deal with risk; most 
importantly, they also influence the cost and quality of care. On those 
fronts the government as payer has powerful tools to promote 
desirable outcomes, but the government’s advantages are not so 
profound as to make private payers—either from the perspective of an 
individual consumer or society—unreasonable alternatives. 
At the heart of the cost and quality of care challenge is the core 
promise that both public and private payers make; namely, that the 
insureds will receive “medically necessary” care. This promise does 
little to define quality beyond a minimum and nothing to address cost, 
and in fact, may stand as an obstacle to the efficient pursuit of both.  
A. Medical Necessity as the Care Promise 
Both public and private payers promise to provide “medically 
necessary” care.62 Intuitively, there are at least two reasons why. First, 
it accords with certain moral intuitions about what people should be 
able to get if they are sick: whatever care is medically necessary to 
address their condition.63 Second, and relatedly, it acknowledges the 
complicated reality of health care as a good. The health care that one 
needs varies depending upon the affliction from which one suffers. It 
is thus difficult to define the bounds of health care promise in a simple 
way ex-ante.64 Medical necessity is what fills the gap. 
Consider insuring against the loss of an “easier” good: jewelry, 
for example. One knows much of the time precisely what one will 
need, i.e., the replacement of the jewelry, and how much one will need 
to address the loss event, i.e., the replacement cost of the jewelry. 
Alternatively, to the extent that the jewelry is damaged, the insurance 
 
 62. See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform 
Hasn’t Worked, 101 GEO. L.J. 519, 526 (2013) (describing medical necessity in 
Medicare). 
 63. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
1449, 1452–53 (1994) (discussing moral intuitions that underlie health care debates). 
 64. See John V. Jacobi, Tara Adams Ragone & Kate Greenwood, Health 
Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care Act: Assessing the Need for 
Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
109, 130 (2015) (describing how “the infinite complexity of human medical 
conditions” makes ex-ante specification impossible). 
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promise will not include fixes that cost more than the price of the 
original jewelry, nor fixes that will use component parts that are worth 
more than the original components.  
Health insurance is much more complicated. It is difficult to 
know in advance, and therefore explicitly incorporate into the 
promise, what one will need. Trouble breathing, for example, does not 
mean that one needs a replacement lung; an expert is needed to figure 
out what the “fix” even is.65 The way to resolve whether one needs a 
lung transplant or an inhaler is by asking a physician what is medically 
necessary to address the breathing difficulty. Moreover, because 
individuals are not accustomed to financially valuing human life—
particularly their own—and are indeed repeatedly told in art, culture, 
and politics that human life is priceless, the assumption is that, unlike 
jewelry, the only question that should matter is whether the “fix” is 
medically needed or not. Given that psychological starting point, as 
well as the opacity of medical pricing, “medical necessity” is a natural 
outgrowth of how underinformed and inexpert consumers would 
demand that an insurance promise be made and priced, as I have 
argued in a previous work.66 
It is thus unsurprising that both private and public insurance use 
the medical necessity concept as the core of the care promise. It 
describes both what people believe they are morally entitled to and 
how people assume health insurance should work.  
B. The Cost Problem of Medical Necessity 
The first difficulty with the medical necessity standard is that it 
does not incorporate cost. Medical necessity, in effect, asks whether a 
particular treatment will do a peppercorn of good; a treatment that 
does five peppercorns of good is arguably more necessary than one 
that does four peppercorns of good, even if the marginal cost of the 
fifth peppercorn is ten times the additional cost. One covered by a 
medical necessity promise—whether an insured capable of filing a 
lawsuit or a voter capable of going to the ballot box—will seek the 
latter.67  
 
 65. See Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60 
ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1234 (1992) (recognizing the importance of diagnosis). 
 66. See Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 433, 461–63 (2010) (explaining how “medical necessity” is an organic 
market outgrowth of the moral intuitions and cognitive limitations of consumers). 
 67. Insurers will use categorical exclusions regarding experimental or 
cosmetic procedures, of course. See generally John Bronsteen, Brendan S. Maher & 
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More abstractly, an indemnity promise that is not perfectly 
experience-rated presents a problem of ex-post demand-side moral 
hazard; insureds facing a loss event will choose the “fix” most 
consistent with their preferences without regard to cost.68 The standard 
account is that such actions will lead to far higher consumption levels 
of the insured good than would occur in the absence of insurance and 
ultimately increase its cost.69 Indemnity also creates supply-side moral 
hazard, i.e., medical providers engaging in service provision—or 
creation—without regard to cost.70 Where doctors receive pay for the 
amount of services provided, and innovators know new care 
products—drugs, procedures, technology—that offer only an 
additional peppercorn of positive health outcome will be covered, 
overproduction is likely.71 As I have written elsewhere, I believe 
“moral hazard” is a widely misunderstood term that can carry 
inaccurate connotations; I instead prefer the term “discretionary cost 
pressure.”72 The point is the same: Where an insured or a provider is 
in a position where he is indifferent to cost, that indifference is likely 
to result in higher cost at the micro and macro level.73  
Moreover, health care is particularly susceptible to cost growth 
from supply side discretionary cost pressure because there is no robust 
noninsured market, i.e., a market where nonindigents make 
purchasing decisions based on ability to pay, to exert cost-containment 
pressure. The individual and the market demand curve for repairing 
most goods will be generally constrained in some fashion by the 
 
Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United 
States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297 (2008) (discussing categorical health insurance 
exclusions). But the point is that if those exclusions do not apply, there is no explicit 
cost constraint at work. 
 68. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 531, 535–37 (1968). Pauly’s work is the foundational work in the field. 
 69. See id.; see also D. Ward Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third 
Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645, 647–48 
(1978) (identifying inflationary incentives of both patients and providers).  
 70. See, e.g., McLean & Richards, supra note 22, at 293. 
 71. See id. (“[M]any new drugs offer marginal or no benefits to most patients 
when compared with existing remedies . . . [yet] cost much more than existing 
drugs.”); see also Lawrence J. Appel, The Verdict from ALLHAT—Thiazide Diuretics 
Are the Preferred Initial Therapy for Hypertension, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3039, 
3039–42 (2002) (explaining the superior effectiveness for treating hypertension of 
inexpensive diuretics over more costly patented drugs).  
 72. See Maher & Stris, supra note 66, at 463 n.142 (arguing in favor of 
“discretionary cost pressure” as the superior term). 
 73. See id. at 462 (explaining that the lack of an explicit marginal cost 
limitation creates a “relentless upward cost pressure on the promise”). 
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object’s market value, as determined in a pure market. Tailors charge 
less than mechanics because clothes cost less than cars. It makes no 
sense to develop a business repairing objects of a certain type if the 
cost of performing the repairs exceed the value of the good. One would 
not expect that owners of the subject good would be willing to pay 
more than the value of the good to fix it; they would choose to replace 
it instead. But there is no independent market for health. 
Accordingly, the supply-side discretionary pressure on the price 
of medical services—roughly, those services for which the primary 
aim is to restore health—are not constrained by noninsured market 
values.74 The obvious incentive for medical innovators is to attempt to 
create services that are marginally more effective without regard for 
cost, and for treating physicians to recommend more costly 
procedures.75 Hence the worry about the “cost-spiral” in health care 
and constant talk by policymakers about how to “bend the cost-
curve.”76 
C. The Quality Problem of Medical Necessity 
The second problem of the medical necessity promise is the 
consequences it has for quality of care. It does not cover treatments 
that are worthless, as those treatments are unnecessary. But it is often 
the case that more than one potential treatment could “work,” and the 
medically necessary promise on its own does not speak to how to 
choose among worthy options. 
Put slightly more formally, medical necessity can be thought of 
as requiring some decisionmaker to answer two questions. The first 
(threshold) question is whether a given treatment will do any good, 
i.e., whether it is worthless. The second (comparative) question is 
which is the better option between two non-worthless treatment 
choices, i.e., which salutary treatment option will do more 
peppercorns of good.  
 
 74. See Pauly, supra note 68, at 535–37. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Ehsan U. Syed, Will We Ever Bend the Cost Curve in Healthcare?, 
12 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 186, 187 (2019); see also Ezra Klein, Does Health-
Care Reform Bend the Cost Curve Up?, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2010, 12:30 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/09/does_health-care_reform_ 
bend_t.html [https://perma.cc/CY82-5DRE]; Girard Miller, Bending the Medical-
Cost Curve, GOVERNING (Oct. 21, 2010, 4:30 PM), https://www.governing.com/ 
columns/public-money/Bending-Medical-Cost-Curve.html [https://perma.cc/4N57-
K8D5].  
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In both cases, the original approach to applying the medical 
necessity standard was to utilize the judgment of the patient’s 
physician: She would determine what was necessary in the first 
instance, i.e., the threshold issue, ruling out worthless treatments. She 
would likewise determine which of the potential treatment options was 
better, i.e., the comparativeness issue, choosing among worthy 
treatments. That approach, however, posed several interrelated 
problems. 
First, in the original fee for service model, a physician might find 
herself in the following situation: She will have correctly determined 
that there are two treatments that will both actually help the patient, 
i.e., neither treatment is worthless. Yet she finds it also to be true that 
decisively resolving which treatment is in fact better for this particular 
patient is challenging, while nonetheless knowing for sure that one of 
those methods is more lucrative for her than the other.77 Because the 
patient himself has no meaningful ability to compare treatments, the 
temptation for the physician to simply choose the more costly 
treatment will be high.78 In other words, the pursuit of effectiveness 
might be abandoned due to the siren of dollars. 
Second, the individual physician is not a reliable assessor of her 
own quality. Locating the necessity inquiry in her, with no overview, 
meant tolerating some likelihood that she would not make the right 
choice with respect to either the threshold aspect or the 
comparativeness aspect, as well as the likelihood that she would, even 
if she chose the optimal treatment option, not implement it as well as 
a more competent physician. 
Both problems were further compounded by the fact that patients 
are not sophisticated consumers of medical care: They choose their 
providers by virtue of proximity, bedside manner, or happenstance, 
not after a searching review of the physician’s past performance.79 
 
 77. See, e.g., Ira L. Burney et al., Medicare and Medicaid Physician Payment 
Incentives, 1 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 62, 68–70 (1979) (describing empirical study of 
physician incentives in fee-for-service model). 
 78. See John P. Bunker, Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of Operations 
and Surgeons in the United States and in England and Wales, 282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
135, 139 (1970). Nor are patients hard to sway. See Shannon Brownlee, Vikas Saini 
& Christine K. Cassel, When Less Is More: Issues of Overuse in Health Care, HEALTH 
AFFS. (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140425. 
038647/full/ [https://perma.cc/38SU-3UWX] (“Patients often believe implicitly that 
there’s always one more test, one more treatment to try, and that their doctor would 
never recommend a procedure or a stay in the ICU that was not in their best interest.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Katherine M. Harris, How Do Patients Choose Physicians? 
Evidence from a National Survey of Enrollees in Employment-Related Health Plans, 
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Thus, the relevant actor with regard to determining and supplying 
medically necessary care was a physician chosen and trusted by the 
patient using a decision process unrelated to the actual quality of the 
physician’s diagnostic or performance abilities. Under such 
circumstances, care deemed “medically necessary” would only 
loosely correlate with the most effective care. 
D. Cost and Quality Approaches 
It took payers, both private and public, some time to recognize 
the theoretical and practical limitations of the medical necessity 
promise. Private health insurance first spread in the 1930s, but it was 
not until the late 1970s that private payers adopted significant efforts 
to control costs.80 As for the government, the first meaningful effort to 
control Medicare’s costs, in 1983, occurred almost twenty years after 
its enactment.81 The reality is that, in contrast to risk, no societal 
consensus has been reached on how to best address challenges 
inherent in a health care financing arrangement that hinges on 
promising medically necessary care.  
Countless pages have since been written on the different 
approaches taken by both private and public payers to constrain cost 
and promote quality. For our purposes, however, only a general 
overview is necessary. The most-frequently tried approaches are (1) 
bulk buying power, (2) discretion allocation, (3) internalization, (4) 
evidence-based treatment constraints, and (5) quality metrics.82  
1. Bulk Buying Power 
The first way to tamp down costs is neither complicated nor 
specific to health care: keep costs lower by having big payers refuse 
to pay more than a certain amount for the medical services being 
provided. The larger the buyer, the more power it has to negotiate low 
 
38 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 711, 712 (2003) (summarizing the literature as supporting 
the notion that patients do not rationally search for or choose physicians).  
 80. See, e.g., Kallstrom, supra note 69, at 647–49 (discussing now-common 
cost-control measures that most insurers in 1978 had not yet adopted); Sara 
Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically 
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 230 (1999). 
 81. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601–07, 
97 Stat. 65, 149–72 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2018)). 
 82. As will become clear in the discussion below, several of these approaches 
address both cost and quality. The order in the text begins with the most-cost focused 
and ends with the most-quality focused.  
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prices. Large private insurers use this power to negotiate lower 
reimbursement rates for their in-network doctors who they attract by 
promising volume. The government, as the largest buyer of health care 
of all, has long since adopted a payment schedule that uses its buying 
power to dictate lower prices still.83 Providers sign up to be Medicare 
providers not because they are compelled to, but because the 
government controls such a volume of patients that, even with 
Medicare’s low reimbursement rates, most physicians opt to do so. 
2. Discretion Allocation 
As discussed in Section III.C, a promise to pay for medically 
necessary treatment requires a judgment on the part of someone that a 
sought treatment is, in fact, medically necessary.84 Originally, such 
judgment was wholly exercised by the patient’s physician. But payers 
soon realized that, for the reasons discussed above, physicians often 
have different goals than (1) the patient or (2) the payer, and 
accordingly may exercise their discretion in a way that is financially 
advantageous to the physician but that optimizes neither cost nor 
quality of care.85  
Accordingly, one mechanism to control cost was for the payer to 
arrogate to itself some discretion to determine, either prospectively or 
retrospectively, what services are or were medically necessary and 
thus reimbursable. By locating some discretionary power with regard 
to medical necessity determinations in the payer, both physician-
inspired and patient-inspired care choices that disregarded either cost 
or quality could, in theory, be curbed by payer judgment. Note that 
this approach, in theory, could lead to quality improvements by 
deterring suboptimal but more lucrative care choices. Private payers 
pursued this approach through a number of mechanisms, including 
 
 83. See §§ 601–07. I am referring to hospital and provider reimbursement. 
Drug purchases are another matter. 
 84. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 85. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, Physician Financial 
Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery, 27 RAND J. ECON. 99, 99, 120 (1996) 
(suggesting physicians substituted Cesarean delivery for natural delivery in order to 
make up for negative income shocks from decreased fertility rates). Doctors, in 
contrast, tend to cast the issue in terms of obviously-we-should-have-it physician 
autonomy. See, e.g., Zhiping Walter & Melissa Succi Lopez, Physician Acceptance 
of Information Technologies: Role of Perceived Threat to Professional Autonomy, 46 
DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 206, 208 (2008) (reporting that almost 70% of physicians 
“agreed or strongly agreed that clinical freedom was essential to the practice of 
medicine and physicians should fight against any constraints upon it”). 
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gag rules, precertification requirements, and utilization review 
procedures.86 The government has implicitly done so by the 
promulgation of comprehensive codes that a provider need choose 
when providing treatment for which he hopes to obtain payment.87 To 
the extent that no applicable code exists, that amounts to the 
government’s judgment that the contemplated treatment is not 
medically necessary and therefore not reimbursable.88 
3. Internalization 
Internalization describes the universe of approaches intended to 
promote the efficient provision of care by making providers 
internalize the cost of failure or reap the benefit of success.89 At their 
heart, the original wave of internalization approaches rested upon the 
notion that there is some level of care that the ideal provider—let’s 
call him Dr. Hercules—would provide to a given patient.90 Dr. 
Hercules will never prescribe unnecessary care, nor would he provide 
poor care that would, by virtue of its ineffectiveness, lead to the need 
for additional care. The payment scheme for providers should be based 
on what Dr. Hercules would charge, and to the extent that more care 
than that was provided, the physician should solely or largely bear that 
cost of provision. Note that, like discretion allocation above, this 
approach could improve quality of care because it will theoretically 
incent providers to avoid unnecessary care, as well as to choose care 
options likely to reduce the need for future care. Both private and 
public payers have attempted variants of the internalization approach; 
 
 86. See Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 67, at 2311–27 (discussing 
cost-control measures). 
 87. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICARE SERVS., EVALUATION AND 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES GUIDE 4 (2020) (explaining how matters not included in 
codes are not reimbursable).  
 88. See id. 
 89. A separate set of cost-internalization approaches was designed to curb 
overconsumption of care by consumers. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and 
Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 792 (2006) 
(“The theory behind CDHPs [consumer-driven health plans] is that individuals should 
be incentivized to act as consumers when they purchase medical services.”). A 
problem with that approach is that consumers are unsuited to make care decisions, 
and particularly so in a world of opaque prices. See id. at 818–20; see also Robert H. 
Brook et al., Does Free Care Improve Adults’ Health? Results from a Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1432 (1983) (finding that cost sharing 
leads to patients avoiding obtaining needed care). 
 90. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1101–02 
(1975). The joke will be lost if I include a parenthetical.  
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modern versions are more sophisticated and structure compensation 
using more advanced internalization models, such as those structured 
around health outcomes.91 
4. Evidence-Based Treatment Constraints 
If medicine is more art than the science, evidence-based 
treatment constraints are efforts to bring more science to the art. 
Physicians are educated about best practices in medical school and 
during their residencies, and they engage in professional reading and 
ongoing clinical education thereafter, but the degree and speed to 
which the latest validated findings filter into the treatment they 
recommend to their patients is the opposite of overnight: Some 
observers have suggested it takes 15–20 years before the care we 
should get becomes the care we do get.92 
Evidence-based treatment constraints are payer-generated 
efforts to (1) identify when clinical practice is not adhering to the latest 
findings and (2) get physicians to so adhere. A common approach is 
through the use of “clinical guidelines,” which often incorporate and 
agglomerate the guidelines generated by various players that advise 
 
 91. The idea behind value-based care approaches is that physicians should be 
in part compensated based on the outcome delivered. The ACA added to Medicare’s 
reimbursement system several value-based modifiers to the traditional Medicare fee 
schedules. See Medicare FFS Physician Feedback Program/Value-Based Payment 
Modifier, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 12, 2016, 8:47 AM), 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ 
PhysicianFeedbackProgram/index [https://perma.cc/7PHX-YJJC] (“The Value 
Modifier provides for differential payment under the Medicare Physician Fee 
Schedule (PFS) based on the quality of care furnished compared to the cost of care 
during a performance period.”); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SUMMARY 
OF 2015 PHYSICIAN VALUE-BASED PAYMENT MODIFIER POLICIES 3 (2015) (explaining 
that the program is budget neutral, meaning some physicians will effectively get 
bonuses and others debited). See generally Kenneth W. Field & Douglas E. Litvack, 
Health Care Merger Analysis in the Era of Payment Reform, 24 J. ANTITRUST, UCL 
& PRIV. SECTION ST. BAR CAL. 42 (2015) (describing several broad types of risk-based 
payment approaches in private settings). The evidence on the success of value-based 
incentive structures is mixed. See Wendy Netter Epstein, Revisiting Incentive-Based 
Contracts, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1, 46–48 (2017) (examining 
empirical studies evaluating success of value-based compensation structures). 
 92. Paul H. Keckley, Evidence-Based Medicine in Managed Care: A Survey 
of Current and Emerging Strategies, 6 MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 56, 56–58 (2004) 
(paraphrasing the Institute of Medicine’s description of the problem). 
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providers what the latest evidence supports—and in some cases, what 
the payer customarily or exclusively reimburses.93  
5. Quality Metrics 
Outside of the extremes, neither the physician’s skill (when 
compared to other physicians performing the same treatment) or the 
treatment’s effectiveness (when compared to the same physician 
performing the alternative treatment) are readily ascertainable by a 
current or prospective patient. Indeed, because of the multifactorial 
challenge inherent in evaluating provider performance—i.e., the 
difficulty in figuring out whether a doctor’s results were worse 
because he saw people with more serious ailments to begin with or 
because he is a worse doctor—ex-post evaluation of provider 
performance, even by experts, is far from easy. The idea behind 
quality metrics is to analyze information that can serve the latter 
purpose—and thus give payers the power to act accordingly to incent 
or penalize good performance—with the hope of someday translating 
those insights into metrics usable by consumers.94 Both private and 
public payers are accordingly pursuing quality-driven approaches.95 
E. Government Advantages 
1. On Cost 
One might be tempted to conclude that the government—as a 
nonprofit actor not making a contractual promise—is not susceptible 
to the cost problem. But that is not so. To the extent that the public 
promise of health care turns on medical necessity without explicit 
reference to marginal cost, the government will face discretionary cost 
pressure politically—i.e., voters insisting that as taxpaying citizens, 
they deserve every peppercorn of care and medical innovators 
predicting the government will give in to voters. 
 
 93. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped 
Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 16–18, 28 (2011) 
(discussing clinical practice guidelines). 
 94. See infra Part IV. 
 95. See Kristin M. Madison, From HCQIA to the ACA: The Evolution of 
Reporting as a Quality Improvement Tool, 33 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 78–82 (2012) 
(explaining how states, the federal government, and private actors are pursuing quality 
recording and reporting efforts). Professor Madison observes, however, that “the 
pervasiveness of quality reporting does not guarantee its usefulness as a quality 
improvement mechanism for individual physicians.” Id. at 80; see also infra Part IV. 
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The chief tool the American government has used to control cost 
to date is buying power. Because Medicare participation is voluntary, 
its reimbursement rates and fee schedule (discussed in more detail 
below) are better thought of as an incident of the government’s market 
power as the largest buyer of health care, rather than its regulatory 
power as sovereign.96 It is worth a brief detour to consider the 
evolution of Medicare’s payment scheme, which is famously 
complicated and jargon-filled.97 Abstraction will spare us engagement 
with those mind-numbing particulars.  
Medicare originally adopted a payment approach using a fee-for-
service model for providers and a cost-incurred model for hospitals 
(which is a rough analog to the fee-for-service model but in which the 
hospital’s time and effort was reimbursed on a cost basis).98. By the 
early 1980s, Congress became concerned that its original approach 
was too expensive and highly susceptible to cost growth.99 It thereafter 
moved to a “prospective payment system,” which amounted to a 
broadly comprehensive fee schedule that spelled out how much 
particular acts with respect to particular conditions would get 
 
 96. In effect, the government has announced, “We will pay X and no more to 
any physician who accepts our offer.” That more resembles private buying behavior 
than a sovereign flexing its regulatory muscles. The government could, of course, use 
its regulatory power to set prices for certain goods independent of whether the 
government was buying the good or not. But it has not broadly done so, and that 
exercise would, in any event, be subject to the same allocative efficiency concerns 
described in the text. 
 97. As the Fourth Circuit once acidly observed:  
There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, 
involving the financing of Medicare and Medicaid, are among the most 
completely impenetrable texts within human experience. Indeed, one 
approaches them at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread, for 
not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but Congress also 
revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process 
and making any solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase. 
Rehab. Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994). If 
anything, that understates the matter. See id. 
 98. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, THE 
LAW OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 60 (2d ed. 2018) (describing Medicare’s original 
payment approach). 
 99. See, e.g., Robert M. Gibson, Daniel R. Waldo & Katharine R. Levit, 
National Health Care Expenditures, 1982, 5 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1, 1 (1983) 
(documenting cost growth and congressional “concern over the survival of 
government entitlement programs”). 
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reimbursed, regardless (mostly) of the actual time and effort expended 
to treat.100  
When, for example, the Diagnostic-related Group (DRG) system 
was introduced with respect to hospital reimbursement in the 1980s, 
observers complained that the result was that hospitals were simply 
discharging patients “quicker and sicker.”101 The reason was the way 
the original DRG system worked: It spelled out the amount of money 
a hospital would be reimbursed for certain conditions, and no more.102 
As a result, patients would be discharged even if they were not well 
enough to be, and, to the extent they were readmitted, the hospital 
would seek a new DRG reimbursement.103 The DRG system was 
subsequently overhauled, with a more comprehensive DRG list—that 
more accurately reflected the care realities of more serious 
conditions—as well as the inclusion of readmittance penalties, to deter 
system gaming.104 
Similar adjustments were made to Medicare Part B (provider) 
reimbursements.105 Medicare Part B provider reimbursement for most 
services is based on the annually produced Medicare Physician Fee 
Schedule.106 There is some flexibility in the codes one can fill out for 
reimbursement based on the amount of time taken, but largely the fees 
 
 100. 22 Ill. Prac. 3d § 23:21. The fee schedules for both hospitals and 
physicians (discussed later in the text) attempt to bake in intensity and effort, see 2 
Health L. Prac. Guide § 25:25 (describing how reimbursement base is compensated 
for a given treatment act), but in practice there are limited reimbursement options to 
the extent a doctor is more aggressive than the codes contemplate. See 2 Health L. 
Prac. Guide § 25:29 (discussing coding); see also 22 Ill Prac. 3d § 23:21 (noting 
limited options for additional payment). But see supra note 91 and accompanying text 
(describing ACA’s efforts to add incentive-based compensation to Medicare). 
 101. Bagley, supra note 62, at 544 (explaining the 1983 reforms); see also 
Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and Impairment at 
Discharge: The ‘Quicker-and-Sicker’ Story Revisited, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1980, 
1982 (1990) (discussing quicker and sicker phenomenon). DRG stands for “diagnosis-
related group.” The idea is to comprehensively categorize conditions and the 
corresponding treatment, such that one can determine what the expected cost of 
treating the condition will be.  
 102. See 22 Ill. Prac. 3d § 23:22. 
 103. See Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Prospective Payment System and 
Impairment at Discharge: The ‘Quicker-and-Sicker’ Story Revisited, 264 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1980, 1982 (1990) (discussing early challenges of DRG system). 
 104. See, e.g., 22 Ill. Prac. 3d § 23:22 (“Within each DRG, hospital payment 
is fixed, with the possible exception of outlier payments in a limited number of 
circumstances.”). 
 105. See Bagley, supra note 62, at 540–41 (explaining adjustments to 
Medicare’s compensation of physicians). 
 106. See id. 
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are fixed without regard to the actual effort expended or the difficulty 
thereof.107 
Those adjustments to the Medicare payment approach 
represented a deliberate and meaningful reduction in reimbursable 
unit cost and reimbursable volume, compared to what was and is 
available from private payers, for hospitals and providers.108 The 
government’s buying power and payment discipline, in other words, 
have seemingly allowed it to outperform its private rivals on cost. 
But the government’s cost advantage might not be costless. A 
market with overly powerful buyers—the most extreme of which, a 
single buyer market, is a monopsony—risks driving down the price of 
the good in question so low that society risks allocative inefficiency 
in two classic ways. The first is an underinvestment in human capital, 
i.e., too few people will choose to be doctors rather than bankers. The 
second is an underinvestment in medical advances, i.e., too little 
resources will be devoted to developing medical breakthroughs.109  
In a world where the government is paying considerably less for 
care than private players, it is unclear, and probably unknowable, as 
to what the additional monies spent by private payers were or are 
“buying” society—or, conversely, what the saved government dollars 
were “costing” society.110 Was every additional dollar spent for better 
care? Was every additional dollar spent a waste? Was every dollar the 
government saved one that contributed to too few medical advances? 
Was every additional dollar spent a cross-subsidy that made the 
 
 107. See id. 
 108. See, e.g., JARED LANE MAEDA & LYLE NELSON, AN ANALYSIS OF 
HOSPITAL PRICES FOR COMMERCIAL AND MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS (2017); 
DARIA PELECH, AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE-SECTOR PRICES FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES 
(2017); Gary N. Nugent et al., Value for Taxpayers’ Dollars: What VA Care Would 
Cost at Medicare Prices, 61 MED. CARE RSCH. & REV. 495, 501 (2004) (finding that 
services provided by the Veterans Health Administration would have cost about 21% 
more if those services had been delivered through the private sector at Medicare’s 
payment rates). 
 109. See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Managed Care, Market Power, and 
Monopsony, 33 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1439, 1459 (1998) (warning about risks of 
monopsony); see also Mark V. Pauly, U.S. Health Care Costs: The Untold True Story, 
12 HEALTH AFFS. 152, 153–54 (1993) (arguing that the higher cost of health care in 
the United States is not because of waste and inefficiency). 
 110. See, e.g., H.E. FRECH III, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN MEDICAL 
CARE, at ix, 84 (1996) (“Making sense of the sprawling literature and disparate 
empirical results requires theoretical and empirical judgment.”); Gerald E. Anderson 
et al., It’s the Prices Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from Other 
Countries, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 89, 90 (2003) (arguing that higher relative price of care 
in the United States is not justified). 
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collective expenditure for medical care by public and private payers 
allocatively efficient?111  
There is certainly reason to think that the government’s cost 
control efforts are on balance salutary, particularly given how much 
other governments around the world pay for care—namely, less.112 Yet 
that there appears to be some room for the government’s purchasing 
power to reduce the cost of medical care without destroying entry and 
innovation incentives does not mean that the existence of a more-
costly private market is wasteful or suboptimal.  
2. On Quality 
As the historical efforts to improve care show, quality-
promoting efforts generally pursue one of three conceptual objectives: 
(1) identifying quality providers, (2) identifying effective and 
comparatively effective treatments, and (3) creating incentive 
payment structures that encourage physicians to make decisions that 
lead to effective care.113 Here, the government’s advantages are 
considerably less obvious than on risk and cost.  
The government certainly can and should gather information and 
sponsor research that makes the first two objectives easier, but it can 
do so regardless of whether it serves as a payer or not. As to the 
creation of incentive structures, it is difficult to see why or how the 
government will do a better job innovating incentive structures than 
private competitive players.  
Simultaneously, the risks of having the government as the sole 
actor of this task seem acute. I noted above that incentive measures to 
control cost can implicitly have positive effects on quality, serving as 
discouragements for physicians to provide suboptimal care that breeds 
the need for more care. Yet the converse is also true: Cost control 
measures can also lead to worse or no care. The Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) was the recipient of much theoretical praise for 
using capitation and similar mechanisms to deter physicians from 
overproviding care, but the practical result was widespread patient 
unhappiness and “stinting,” i.e., the under-provision of care.114 The 
 
 111. See infra Subsection IV.C.1. 
 112. See Anderson et al., supra note 110, at 90. 
 113. See supra Section III.D. 
 114. See, e.g., Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Payment 
Systems for Health Services, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 375, 375–76 (1990) (discussing a 
theory of stinting); Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, Provider Behavior Under 
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analog to that with a public payer is that some doctors simply will not 
take Medicare patients because the fee schedules either do not cover 
the needed care or (more likely) will not economically justify the 
amount of time and effort the doctor believes is necessary to treat 
patients with certain difficult conditions. In short, payment strictures 
virtuous from a cost perspective might repel superior practitioners. 
Having multiple payers using different incentive and payment 
structures seems to be the safer course. 
The foregoing, importantly, does not mean the government is a 
hidebound incompetent incapable of pursuing meaningful quality-
promoting initiatives. To the contrary, the federal government has 
attempted numerous programs on this score, several of which 
observers believe have reasonable promise.115 But two points are worth 
noting. First, to the extent that the government is serving as an 
information gatherer and promulgater, it can do that without being a 
payer. Second, whatever the government’s nascent successes in 
promoting quality, the results are not so overwhelming as to suggest 
private payers could not do better.116 
3. On Cost and Quality Tradeoffs 
None of the government’s potential advantages with respect to 
cost and quality aid it with the thorniest problem of all: cost-
effectiveness.117 Let us first define the relevant terms.  
A treatment that is “effective” is one that does at least one 
peppercorn of good.118 A treatment that is “comparatively effective” is 
one that does more peppercorns of good than a competing treatment.119 
Reliably identifying what treatments are effective and then, among 
 
Prospective Reimbursement: Cost Sharing and Supply, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 148 
(1986) (examining a theory of stinting).  
 115. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 91, at 18–22 (2017) (remarking that “[b]y 
some measures, the ACA includes forty five different provisions aimed at reforming 
health-care delivery to either improve the quality and/or the efficiency of health care 
in some way” of which the three biggest are ACOs, physician incentive pay, and 
bundled payments). Both the ACA and the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
of 2015 required the government to pursue quality-evaluating (e.g., the Physician 
Quality Reporting System) and quality-communicating (e.g., the creation of a website 
entitled “Physician Compare”) initiatives. See id. at 19. 
 116. See id. at 45–46. 
 117. See Peter J. Neumann, Allison B. Rosen & Milton C. Weinstein, 
Medicare and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1516 (2005). 
 118. See, e.g., Sarah J. Whitehead & Shehzad Ali, Health Outcomes in 
Economic Evaluation: The QALY and Utilities, 96 BRIT. MED. BULL. 5, 5 (2010). 
 119. See Neumann, Rosen & Weinstein, supra note 117, at 1517. 
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effective treatments, reliably identifying which is the most 
comparatively effective are important and difficult tasks.120 But the 
tools brought to bear on resolving those hard questions cannot answer 
the final question: Which treatment is the most cost-effective? That is 
the ultimate question in a world of limited resources because there is 
some price above which society does not believe that either its private 
or public payers should be obligated to pay for an additional 
peppercorn of good; those dollars are better spent on something else.  
As a conceptual matter, cost-effectiveness is easy enough to 
define. It is the treatment that restores the most amount of “health 
units” per dollar.121 The intuitive way to measure health outcomes, and 
then determine whether a marginal increase is worth the additional 
cost, is to measure epidemiological outcomes specific to the particular 
treatment; for example, the amount blood pressure drops after a course 
of hypertension medication, the degree to which range of movement 
returns after shoulder surgery, or the five-year survival rate for certain 
cancer treatments.122 One would see how much better Treatment A 
scores than Treatment B along the relevant outcome vector, and then 
ask whether that increase in health outcome is worth the higher cost 
of Treatment A.  
The value of that type of cost-effectiveness approach, however, 
is limited for general payers—whether private or public—because the 
analysis is not fungible.123 One cannot meaningfully compare blood 
pressure declines with increases in shoulder movement.124 Thus, one 
cannot determine whether one should spend additional dollars on the 
blood pressure medicine that is better but more costly than its next best 
treatment option or on the shoulder surgery that is better but more 
costly than its next best treatment option.125 To solve that problem—
to allow payers to compare health outcomes with different 
epidemiological characteristics—health economists developed a 
variety of ways to measure health outcomes in a fungible manner, i.e., 
to effectively calculate health units.126  
 
 120. See supra Section III.C. 
 121. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New 
Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 1, 8–9 (2006). 
 122. See MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR ECONOMIC 
EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES 103 (3d ed. 2005). 
 123. See Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1050 (1997). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Whitehead & Ali, supra note 118, at 17–19. 
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The Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) is the most well-known 
example, but there are others.127 QALYs assign a quality of life value 
of “1” to a year of perfect health and “0” to death; adverse health states 
in between perfect health and death are assigned fractional values 
between zero and one.128 The QALY value of a particular treatment is 
determined by multiplying the expected post-treatment quality of life 
value by the years spent in that state, minus the QALY calculation for 
no treatment.129 QALY calculations thus combine both the morbidity 
(quality of life) consequences and mortality consequences of a given 
treatment and permit comparison of vastly different epidemiological 
outcomes.130  
With sufficiently robust QALY (or similar) data, a meaningful 
alteration could be made to the coverage promise. Instead of a promise 
of all “medically necessary care,” one can imagine a promise that 
offers to provide all medically necessary treatments less costly than X 
thousand dollars per QALY. Such a promise—call it a cost-
effectiveness promise—excludes not only ineffective treatments 
(waste), but also treatments that offer a marginal benefit below a 
certain predetermined ratio (caviar).131 
An explicit cost-effectiveness constraint is enormously valuable 
because it directly constrains discretionary cost pressure of both the 
demand and supply side variety—at least regarding those services who 
fall outside the threshold.132 Demand side players will be unable to 
obtain a “necessary” treatment if the marginal benefit is smaller than 
the minimum threshold set forth in the promise; supply side players 
will have less incentive to prescribe or develop treatments outside the 
threshold.133  
 
 127. There are a variety of ways the quality of life values can be determined. 
For an involved discussion, see generally DRUMMOND ET AL., supra note 122. 
 128. See Rai, supra note 123, at 1050. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Adler, supra note 121, at 1–2. To be sure, QALYs are not perfect; 
scholars have discussed their shortcomings and discussed alternative metrics. See, 
e.g., id. at 43–53 (discussing QALY limitations); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care 
Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 501 (1995) (considering whether 
QALYs impermissibly discriminate against the disabled); Ani B. Satz, The Limits of 
Health Care Reform, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1451, 1485–87 (2008) (discussing ethical 
concerns regarding QALYs); Whitehead & Ali, supra note 118, at 17–19 (discussing 
alternatives to QALYs, including Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) that respond 
to various criticisms). 
 131. See Peters, supra note 130, at 495–96. 
 132. See id. at 496. 
 133. See Rai, supra note 123, at 1048–49. Buying power alone does not 
resolve this problem. Even in a monopsony market, there will be a treatment that does 
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Ultimately, any payer who makes the “medically necessary” 
promise of care is bound by the reality that it has limited resources to 
make good on that promise.134 For a private payer, that limit is equal 
to premiums collected plus the returns it earns on investing those 
premiums; for the government, it is taxes collected for that purpose 
plus whatever other percentage of the federal fisc it wishes to draw 
upon.135 But everything has a limit, and thus there is some line on 
expenditure that must be drawn. Limiting the coverage promise to care 
that has met some threshold of cost-effectiveness, i.e., to treatments 
that will restore some minimum amount of health per dollar, is the 
only way to transparently, explicitly, and squarely bound discretionary 
cost pressure.136 It is precisely what health scholars have been urging 
for many years.137 
Americans, however, have not reacted well to attempts to 
incorporate cost-effectiveness metrics into coverage decisions made 
by governments.138 Any hint of a QALY-like constraint being 
considered by the government has been criticized as unacceptable 
“rationing” equivalent to reliance on “death panels.”139 Medicare is 
 
five peppercorns of good for $100, and a competing treatment that does six 
peppercorns of good for $500. The existence of the latter will politically push doctors 
to suggest it, the government to cover it, and innovators to prioritize a peppercorn of 
good over the marginal value of the innovation. 
 134. See Peters, supra note 130, at 496. 
 135. See Satz, supra note 130, at 1459–62. 
 136. See Rai, supra note 123, at 1048–49. Consider a silly but illustrative 
example: video game characters. In many video games, player–characters have 
“health points” or “health level” or something similar. When, during the course of the 
game, the character is injured by a video adversary or obstacle, his health points 
decrease by a discrete amount. In the video game world, a cost-effectiveness insurance 
promise would cover all treatments for the character that restored X or more number 
of health points for Y or less number of dollars (or gold pieces, or star credits, or 
whatever the currency in the game).  
 137. See Muriel R. Gillick, Medicare Coverage for Technological 
Innovations—Time for New Criteria?, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2199, 2201 (2004); Rai, 
supra note 123, at 1018; Neumann, Rosen & Weinstein, supra note 117, at 1520. The 
British government uses cost-per-QALY largely, although not exclusively, in 
connection with its coverage recommendations. See Steven D. Pearson & Michael D. 
Rawlins, Quality, Innovation, and Value for Money: NICE and the British National 
Health Service, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2618, 2619 (2005). 
 138. See Neumann, Rosen & Weinstein, supra note 117, at 1516. 
 139. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 
13 NEV. L.J. 872, 885–86 (2013) (enumerating and explaining federal law prohibitions 
against using cost-effectiveness metrics). In the early 1990s, Oregon famously 
attempted to use QALYs in regard to Medicaid coverage decisions; the episode was a 
political disaster. See Robert M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-
Adjusted Life Years, in VALUING HEALTH CARE: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND 
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explicitly barred from considering cost-effectiveness with respect to 
coverage decisions.140 As a result, the government is politically unable 
to openly use an extremely powerful tool. Instead, in the view of 
knowledgeable observers, it has resorted to considering cost-
effectiveness in a disorganized and sub rosa fashion.141  
IV. LEVERAGING PRIVATE PAYERS 
In the previous Parts, I have argued that the government has an 
overwhelming advantage on risk; a meaningful but bounded 
advantage on cost; no advantage on quality; and a seeming 
disadvantage on cost-effectiveness. Given that, as well as the 
uncertainty around what the right answers are with respect to cost, 
quality, and cost effectiveness, there is good reason to imagine that, in 
the right regulatory scheme, private payers could be welfare 
enhancing. To sharpen the analysis, I imagine how private payers 
might evolve if confronted with a private option.142 
A. Care Delivery Positives 
As scholars have increasingly recognized, private insurers 
perform functions in connection with the insurance promise that 
resembles regulation, and they do so in ways or places where the 
government is unlikely to act as well or at all.143 A similar species of 
rationale, as well as intuitive insights regarding the ability of private 
actors to create value as information intermediaries, suggests that 
private payers could serve that function in the health care context—
and in a way that will attract consumers.144 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 31, 53–
59 (Frank A. Sloan ed., 1996) (describing the political failure of Oregon’s 
experimentation with implementing QALYs). 
 140. See Neumann, Rosen & Weinstein, supra note 117, at 1516. 
 141. See id. at 1519–20. 
 142. This Part does not aim to consider every reason why it might be desirable 
to not have the government be the only player in health care financing. Rather, it 
highlights some underrecognized practical reasons why private insurer involvement 
could make everyone better off.  
 143. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How 
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 200–01 nn.8–10 (2012) 
(setting forth list of scholarship concerning insurers serving as regulators in a variety 
of fields).  
 144. See id. at 201. 
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1. Safety 
The provision of care can be worse than ineffective; it can be 
harmful—sometimes for reasons as simple as poor instrument 
hygiene. As risk bearers, insurers generally have a long history of 
offering risk-reduction advice to insureds concerning safety 
procedures or practices that will reduce the odds of a loss event 
occurring.145 Sometimes insurers require compliance as a condition for 
coverage; other times they offer premium reductions or rebates to 
promote preventative behavior; and other times they simply make 
recommendations.146  
In the health care setting, insurers interact with both the insureds 
and the providers who treat them. In order to avoid rent-seeking on 
risk, regulators may choose to sharply limit what an insurer can ask or 
demand an insured to do.147 But payers also interact with providers and 
thus can retain considerable discretion to regulate the practices of 
providers in ways that could provide a higher safety floor than 
government regulation alone.148 
Insurers have two incentives to deploy this expertise. First, poor 
safety practices can increase the cost of a care episode.149 Second, 
consumers might be willing to pay more for an insurer with a 
reputation as one requiring the hospitals, doctors’ offices, and labs it 
uses to employ safety procedures that exceed federal government 
standards, e.g., the Volvo of health insurance.150 Even if extra care 
caused by lax safety standards is entirely covered by insurance, 
avoiding the time and psychic cost associated with additional remedial 
care could be something for which many consumers would willingly 
pay a higher premium.  
 
 145. See Victor P. Goldberg, Tort Liability for Negligent Inspection by 
Insurers, 2 RSCH. L. & ECON. 65, 72–73 (1980) (discussing examples).  
 146. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 143, at 210–13. 
 147. See infra Part V.  
 148. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 143, at 201. 
 149. See PA. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT COUNCIL, HOSPITAL-
ACQUIRED INFECTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2006) (detailing how, in 2006, the 
Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council found that the “average payment 
for a hospitalization in which a patient acquired an infection was $53,915, while the 
payment when a hospital-acquired infection was not present averaged $8,311”). 
 150. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 143, at 210–11 (discussing how 
safety improvements can consist of both education regarding practice improvements 
in specific situations and the creation of safety codes that can apply writ large).  
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2. Provider Quality 
There is little evidence that patients choose providers based on 
quality.151 Yet because there is no doubt that patients are interested in 
quality, the problem is likely that patients cannot easily ascertain 
which provider is better than another. That is unsurprising because 
actually identifying a doctor’s quality is a challenging exercise, even 
for experts.152 Merely sifting through the existing information to 
extract actionable information as a consumer seems to be an 
insurmountable challenge, particularly given the vast array of federal, 
state, and association databases that speak to some aspect of physician 
quality.153  
One way payers might add value is to gather and develop their 
own ways to assess quality and then strike deals with those 
providers.154 But more likely is that the relevant innovation by insurers 
will be to synthesize information in a way that enables consumers, in 
addition to the payer itself, to understand whether a doctor is highly 
rated or not: through grades, stars, thumbs up, or so on.155 One thing 
that the behavioral economics revolution has made clear is that 
decision-making is difficult, particularly in complicated, 
multifactorial settings—such as choosing a provider.156  
Metrics that render intelligible to a consumer quality data are 
highly valuable.157 The extraordinary twenty-first century rise of 
information companies, such as Google and Facebook, make readily 
apparent in general the massive value that can be gained by gathering, 
synthesizing, and extracting usable information from an otherwise 
staggering ocean of data.158 And note that a profound portion of the 
value-creating impact of identifying quality in both physicians (and 
treatments) will come from translating those quality conclusions into 
 
 151. See generally Harris, supra note 79. 
 152. See id. at 715–17. 
 153. See William M. Sage, Joshua Graff Zivin & Nathaniel B. Chase, 
Bridging the Relational-Regulatory Gap: A Pragmatic Information Policy for Patient 
Safety and Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1284–91 (2006) (discussing 
various sources of information regarding physician quality and safety). 
 154. See id. at 1305. 
 155. See id. at 1281–82. 
 156. See Harris, supra note 79, at 712–13. 
 157. See, e.g., Jullanar Alwazir, Google and Facebook, the Data Collecting 
Companies, MEDIUM (May 14, 2019), https://medium.com/jullanar-alwazir/google-
and-facebook-the-data-collecting-companies-42dd5cb0e016 [https://perma.cc/9XP2-
WQC7]. 
 158. See id. 
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intelligible metrics.159 Whatever a payer may have concluded about the 
superior skill of one physician or treatment, quality improvement will 
be vastly easier if that conclusion can be readily understood by both 
actual and prospective patients: The former will increase the 
likelihood that patient autonomy principles do not frustrate quality 
gains, and the latter will drive patients to the right place.160  
Such innovation is more likely to come from a private payer—
rather than from a free-standing public or private service—because the 
payer can not only make available its quality tools to its insureds to 
promote choice, but can also strike deals with quality providers that 
justifiably pay them more and thus offer their insureds heightened 
access to superior practitioners.161 Finally, private payers have greater 
freedom in making quality assessments than does the government, 
which faces both legal and equitable constraints about what it, as the 
government, can say about private physicians.162 
In sum, private payers are well suited to identify quality 
physicians, using both proprietary and public information; to develop 
metrics comprehensible to consumers regarding such quality; and to 
take action with respect to those providers who do well, such as by 
only including in their network doctors who rate above a certain floor. 
163 All of which is a fancy way of saying private payers can likely 
intelligibly differentiate on quality—an attractive value proposition to 
a significant set of consumers when they are faced with a choice 
between a cheaper public option and a more expensive private plan. 
 
 159. See Sage, Zivin & Chase, supra note 153, at 1268–79. 
 160. See id. at 1268. 
 161. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE 62 
(Michael L. Wachter & Susan M. Wachter eds., 1978). 
 162. See Sage, Zivin & Chase, supra note 153, at 1277–78 (responding to the 
claim that the government can do analysis that is close enough to as good and as 
actionable on safety and quality as private players). Perhaps. But there is little reason 
to believe the government will act so quickly, so definitively, and so intelligibly on 
safety and quality that another take on the subject—by private parties whose key pitch 
for their product is that they are doing a worthwhile job on those fronts—is 
unnecessary or dilatory. 
 163. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 161, at 58–66 (explaining the importance of 
accurate information in making rational care decisions); Sage, Zivin & Chase, supra 
note 153, at 1282 (arguing that the “quality of physicians under contract is a 
distinction worthy of aggressive marketing to consumers”). 
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3. A Special Type of Quality: Personalized Medicine 
A great deal has been written about the promise of “personalized 
medicine” and its potential to improve radically health outcomes.164 
Less has been written about what financing structures are most likely 
to promote its development and adoption. Most scholarship focuses 
(understandably) on matters such as FDA approval.165 
Generally speaking, the quality of care a physician can render 
improves the more the physician knows about the patient.166 In some 
cases, additional information will not be helpful: A doctor need not 
know a person’s DNA in order to use the Heimlich maneuver to stop 
him from choking. But in many other cases, additional information 
about the patient is useful to both prevent the doctor from doing 
something harmful and to improve the effectiveness of a proposed 
treatment. For decades, physicians have secured information by 
having patients provide medical histories and symptom descriptions 
in varying amounts of detail. But recent improvements in both medical 
and data science suggest that the nation is on the precipice of a 
profound personalization trend in health care; namely, the widespread 
use of “personalized” or “precision” medicine.167 
The idea is that making available to physicians biological 
information much more granular and reliable than a person’s self-
reported medical history will result in treatment recommendations that 
will be vastly more effective—or have less side effects.168 If armed 
with their patients’ biomarker specifics, a physician could check the 
relevant research to see that drug X works better on people with 
characteristic A, whereas drug Y works better on people with 
characteristic B, and thus prescribe the former to Patient A and the 
latter to Patient B.  
The original basis for personalized medicine was the expected 
treatment gains that would result from human genome sequencing.169 
 
 164. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PAVING THE WAY FOR 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA’S ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT 2 (2013) [hereinafter FDA]. 
 165. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 419, 423–24 (2015). 
 166. See FDA, supra note 164, at 6. 
 167. See Price, supra note 165, at 420. 
 168. “The goal of personalized medicine is to streamline clinical decision-
making by distinguishing in advance those patients most likely to benefit from a given 
treatment from those who will incur cost and suffer side effects without gaining 
benefit.” FDA, supra note 164, at 6. 
 169. See Price, supra note 165, at 424. 
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But additional bases for personalized medicine have since been 
developed, and personalized medicine’s promise has been enhanced 
farther when combined with data science and artificial intelligence 
algorithms.170 As leading commentator Nicholson Price observed in a 
now widely cited work, there are two types of personalized 
medicine.171 There is “standard” personalized medicine where one 
relies on “scientific and clinical research to identify and explain 
relatively simple biological relationships” between the individual’s 
known characteristics and treatment outcomes.172 But there is also 
“black-box” personalized medicine, where highly advanced machine 
algorithms analyze enormous sets of health information to identify 
treatment improvements that are, by their very nature, neither 
replicable by unaided humans or practically susceptible to clinical 
trial.173  
As Price also correctly observed, the Medicare payment system 
is not designed to accommodate rapid advancements in the 
deployment of personalized treatment protocols.174 The current 
reimbursement approach relies largely on broad-based clinical studies 
and expert commissions to make large-scale determinations about 
appropriate treatments, and is generally skeptical of aggressive 
biomarker testing.175 And while one expects—or at least hopes—that 
will change, given the tremendous promise of personalized medicine, 
it should not be controversial to say that the government as payer is 
unlikely to be as nimble or aggressive as private payers might be.  
Private insurers—and certainly to the extent that they cannot 
compete with the public option on cost—are better suited than the 
government to incent physicians to adopt cutting edge personalized 
medicine treatments, such as by incorporating into treatment planning 
and clinical practice guidelines the recommendations of health 
analysts well-versed in the latest “standard” and “black-box” 
personalized medicine developments. More abstractly, one suspects 
 
 170. See id. at 420–21. 
 171. See id. at 427, 429. 
 172. Id. at 427. 
 173. See id. at 429–30.  
 174. See id. at 462–65. Price proposes government reimbursement approaches 
be modified to more readily find personalized medicine treatments to be reimbursable. 
See id. One hopes that will occur. But that is more likely to do so in a world where 
private payers are aggressive in their own reimbursement strategies.  
 175. See id.; see also Lisa M. Meckley & Peter J. Neumann, Personalized 
Medicine: Factors Influencing Reimbursement, 94 HEALTH POL’Y 91, 97 (2010) 
(anticipating adoption of personalized medicine will be slowed until a “long overdue” 
“revised reimbursement system” occurs). 
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that private players—whether acting alone or as a part of an industry 
association—can develop and adopt any number of coverage-decision 
structures that could promote or incent the adoption of personalized 
medicine treatments during the lag period before Medicare’s own 
coverage wheels have turned.176 That an insurance company offers 
more aggressive reimbursements regarding cutting edge, bespoke 
medicine than does public insurance seems to be a salient 
characteristic for which consumers could rationally pay more.177  
4. Employers 
There is an additional positive wrinkle regarding safety and 
quality on the private market: employer involvement. As many have 
argued elsewhere (including me), the policy merit of providing health 
insurance through the workplace is at best mixed.178  
Yet there are some positives associated with employer 
involvement, including (1) reducing adverse selection risk and (2) the 
fact that the employer, as a more sophisticated player with meaningful 
buying power, is likely a better evaluator of insurance products than a 
single worker.179 This is, in part, why, for example, employment-based 
insurance policies tend to be more robust than those that individuals 
select on their own. In a world where the public option becomes a 
reality, i.e., a world where workers know the employer could not offer 
insurance and simply let employees obtain it through a (cheaper) 
Medicare buy-in—that puts genuine pressure on the employer to use 
its sophistication to actually secure for its workers a superior insurance 
product. Put differently, if one worries that payers might promise 
safety, quality, and cutting-edge personalized medicine but not 
deliver, sophisticated employers may be incented to deter, monitor, 
and prevent such behavior.180  
B. Paradigm Positives 
Private payers, if competing with a public option, may be willing 
to take bold steps that amount to paradigm shifts in how the health 
care financing promise is defined. I consider one possibility in some 
 
 176. See Price, supra note 165, at 465–66. 
 177. That the government may someday modify its own decisional processes 
to match those of private payers is a positive.  
 178. See generally Maher, REBA, supra note 23. 
 179. See id. at 1278–79. 
 180. See id.  
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detail and then make the larger point that health care financing might 
benefit from paradigm experimentation. 
1. Explicit Cost-Effectiveness 
In part to combat claims that the government should not be 
involved in rationing care, Medicare cannot consider the cost or cost-
effectiveness of a technology or service when making coverage 
decisions.181 Yet the “rationing” concern may be surmountable to the 
extent that private insurers explicitly incorporate a cost-effectiveness 
metric into their insurance promise, particularly where Americans 
may enter such a regime by choice.182 
As any sophisticated health commentator will explain, being 
opposed to “rationing” in a world of limited resources is conceptually 
incoherent.183 One may oppose rationing being done by a certain party, 
or the way in which the rationing is done, but when there is more care 
to be purchased than money available to buy it, some form of rationing 
will occur—whether in the form of pretextual denials, longer waiting 
periods, or some other way.184 Where resources are not infinite, 
rationing will occur.185 
 
 181. See generally Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider 
Cost: Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577 (2005) (analyzing 
and explaining historical and legal basis as to why Medicare cannot consider cost in 
its coverage decisions). 
 182. One might wonder why explicit or QALY-like metrics are not broadly 
used in insurance contracts today. The health care cost crisis is more recent than is 
commonly understood: It has only been in the last few decades that the problem was 
big enough to be worth solving. And employing explicit cost effectiveness constraints 
as a solution is more challenging than other alternatives (1) because of the cognitive 
and moral attachment to medical necessity, and (2) because doing so as a practical 
matter requires more sophisticated data analysis and effort. The former problem 
recedes when private insurers are competing against the government; in that instance 
cost effectiveness only governs those who choose it. The latter problem is not 
insignificant, but the incredible amount of information available and the incredible 
advances in data science analysis and health economics make widespread QALY 
analysis possible by properly capitalized private players. See generally Peter J. 
Neumann et al., Comparing the Cost-Per-QALYs Gained and Cost-Per-DALYs 
Averted Literatures [version 2; peer review: 3 approved], GATES OPEN RSCH., Mar. 5, 
2018 (describing thousands of cost-effectiveness studies). 
 183. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Health Care Rationing Rhetoric Overlooks 
Reality, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/business/ 
economy/17leonhardt.html [https://perma.cc/78FG-E586] (“The choice isn’t between 
rationing and not rationing. It’s between rationing well and rationing badly.”). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
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A world in which some number of private insurers explicitly 
specify the basis on which they ration—whether by use to a dollars 
per QALY approach or some similar cost-effectiveness metric—could 
very well persuade some that opting-in to an explicit rationing regime 
is better than the alternative.186 Under even a moderately restrictive 
cost-effectiveness promise, numerous extremely costly treatments 
would not be covered. That could lower the premiums needed to buy 
that policy. Alternatively, an innovative insurer could take the savings 
from the use of a cost-effectiveness metric and use them to pay its 
doctors more, and thus likely attract better doctors, or pay its doctors 
a premium to reserve spots for its patients, which insureds who are 
concerned about waiting periods might find especially attractive. 
The existence of such policies might have positive spillover 
effects—in societal terms—in two potential ways. First, while it may 
take some time to find equilibrium, one expects that some level of 
dollars per QALY, whether $25,000 or $50,000, would become the 
most popular choice in the private market. Assuming the market was 
large enough, that would be a relevant signal to innovators regarding 
which medical advances to pursue; namely, those that have a marginal 
return better than the median QALY per dollar promise made. Put 
more formally, even a signal from a portion of the market is likely to 
reduce the odds that the health care market is allocatively inefficient. 
Second, the adoption of an explicit cost-effectiveness metric in a 
private setting by willing players—as opposed to being imposed on 
anyone via public insurance—will yield useful information about how 
to implement such an approach without the hysteria that attends 
sweeping government changes upon the unwilling.187 
 
 186. Some observers have expressed concern that the use of QALYs 
discriminates against the disabled in potential violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. I do not resolve that debate here, but merely suggest there likely 
exists a cost-effectiveness metric (whether QALY, DALY, or something else) that 
furthers resource allocation without violating the law. Cf. supra note 130 and 
accompanying text (discussing conceptual and legal limits of QALY-like 
approaches). 
 187. See Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice 
Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost 
Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 556 (2014) (arguing that when consumers can choose 
the terms of the coverage contract, “rationing” type concerns will have less salience). 
Korobkin’s very interesting paper proposed “relative value” insurance, but the insight 
about choice carries the same weight here. See id. at 523. 
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2. Paradigm Experimentation 
The American polity has made little progress regarding the 
tradeoffs it wishes to make regarding cost and quality or the financing 
structures most suitable to get there. Given the relative recency of the 
problem, this is not surprising. Consider the following timeline. 
Prior to the 1970s, few believed the fee-for-service model of 
health insurance to be a problem; it was assumed by many observers 
that the profession of medicine behaved largely independently of 
organizational and financing incentives.188 Only in the late 1970s did 
now traditional cost-containment measures—like clinical guidelines, 
utilization review, and network rates—begin to be proposed and then 
adopted.189 Only in the late 1990s and early 2000s did health scholars 
begin to propose that treatments and health outcomes be addressed in 
evidence-driven ways that could not only improve treatment but also 
allow choices to be made about where to put limited dollars.190 And 
only in the last few years has the cost of information and the power to 
analyze it grown substantially enough to design and extract truly 
valuable cost and effectiveness metrics from the data we have and will 
get.191 It was only this decade, for example, that most medical records 
began to be kept electronically.192 
There is thus little reason to believe that we have discovered all 
there is to know about how to finance and deliver care, with the only 
question left being what model to pick and who to drive it.193 We are 
 
 188. See Kallstrom, supra note 69, at 657–58. 
 189. See id. at 672. 
 190. See, e.g., Kathleen N. Lohr, Kristen Eleazer & Josephine Mauskopf, 
Health Policy Issues and Applications for Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, 46 HEALTH POL’Y 1, 7 (1998). 
 191. Cf. Swedloff, supra note 57, at 341 n.6 (remarking that insurers are only 
just beginning to adopt big data analytics).  
 192. See JAWANNA HENRY ET AL., ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD 
SYSTEMS AMONG U.S. NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS: 2008-2015 (2016) 
(showing increasing adoption of electronic health records); see also Karen B. DeSalvo 
& Vindell Washington, By the Numbers: Our Progress in Digitizing Health Care, 
HEALTH IT BUZZ (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/electronic-
health-and-medical-records/numbers-progress-digitizing-health-care 
[https://perma.cc/4DBH-AALE].  
 193. For example, we still have not determined how to decrease the lag time 
from when studies reveal that certain treatments are ineffective (or super effective) to 
when physicians actually adopt them. See Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer 
Nudge, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 593, 599–600 (2018) (decrying the fact that a majority of 
providers “adhere to out-of-date practices long after the evidence mandates change”). 
Nor have we determined whether the new generation of risk-internalization models 
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still in the experimentation phase and have not yet meaningfully 
attempted to engage, for example, on the question of how to integrate 
cost-effectiveness into our financing arrangements.194 Better than to let 
our variegated pursuit to continue, with private players competing 
with the government—and the federal government permitting state 
governments to promote in-state experimentation along the same 
lines.195 
C. Other Positives 
1. Health Care Cross-Subsidy 
During the run-up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, 
opponents of the bill complained bitterly about the Act’s use of “cross-
subsidies” in creating exchange pools, with the implication being that 
cross-subsidies were a particularly nefarious brand of government-
meddling. Yet, as I have written elsewhere, cross-subsidies are far 
more ubiquitous than even expert commentators realize, appearing in 
all manner of regulatory settings, sometimes intentionally and 
sometimes incidentally, but frequently and at least arguably 
advantageously.196 
A cross-subsidy exists when one segment of the purchasing pool 
pays more for a good so another segment can enjoy it for less.197 In 
health care, private payers pay more than public payers for care.198 
While some of that excess payment may be attributable to other 
causes, there is a distinct possibility that some portion of the higher 
 
have been successful in driving down cost without reducing quality (although the 
evidence so far is positive).  
 194. See id. at 600. 
 195. Health scholars have proposed numerous promising ideas that have yet 
to be adopted. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 123, at 1048, 1052 (discussing QALY-based 
insurance); see Avraham, supra note 93, at 25 (detailing clinical guidelines as safe 
harbors); Korobkin, supra note 187, at 556 (discussing relative value insurance); 
Epstein, supra note 193, at 600 (proposing the use of nudges to prevent unnecessary 
care). Some, admittedly, may require changes in federal or state law. That may be 
warranted, but it is also likely that some application of the core idea is applicable even 
absent the express sanction of the relevant sovereign. 
 196. See John R. Brooks, Brian D. Galle & Brendan S. Maher, Cross-
Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1235–36 (2018). 
 197. See id. at 1235. 
 198. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
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cost paid by private players cross-subsidizes public payers.199 This 
raises two concerns for policymakers.  
First, a shrinking or elimination of the private market could 
result in providers demanding higher prices from the government, 
which means the cost savings promised by public payer advocates will 
be less than promised. Second, to the extent the government uses its 
buying (or regulatory) power to resist those price demands, the result 
may be allocatively inefficient in the form of too few doctors and too 
few medical innovations, i.e., a worse health care system for everyone. 
There are a number of counters to this argument, including 
wondering whether it is efficient or fair to ask a portion of the 
citizenry, i.e., those who have private insurance, to pay for better care 
for everyone. As a practical matter, however, to the extent that 
consumers preferring private payers are willing—by refusing the 
choice of a public option—to continue to fund the cross-subsidy that 
is likely present in the current system, one wonders whether 
eliminating that choice makes sense. To the contrary, depending on 
how strongly one believes the private payer cross-subsidy to exist, that 
would be a reason to incent people to choose private financing—
whether through subsidies, rebates, or tax credits.200 
2. Non-Health Value Preferences 
Worth considering briefly are additional reasons why the 
existence of a private market may—even apart from the immediate 
 
 199. There has been considerable academic disagreement over whether 
reforms that result in Medicare paying less will simply result in providers charging 
private payers more (thus wiping out any cost-savings on a system level). Some 
studies conclude yes, while others conclude no. Compare David M. Cutler, Cost 
Shifting or Cost Cutting?: The Incidence of Reductions in Medicare Payments, 12 
TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1, 18 (1998), with Austin Frakt, Hospitals Don’t Shift Costs from 
Medicare or Medicaid to Private Insurers, JAMA NETWORK (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2760166 
[https://perma.cc/6FW2-FMF8] (surveying the more recent literature to conclude no 
cost shift). But a cross-subsidy can exist regardless of whether or not direct cost-
shifting occurs. In a segmented market, where one type of payer pays more, top 
providers (and innovators, as well as builders of physical plant medical infrastructure) 
will have decent reason to believe their work will get those dollars. But those 
providers, innovations, and buildings will, in practice, also be available to the 
consumers who use the cheaper payer. They will be available less, and maybe after a 
longer wait, but the result is still that the higher payer creates a better overall product 
that the lower payer consumers have access to.  
 200. Cf. Brooks, Galle & Maher, supra note 196, at 1249 (describing how 
some cross-subsidies are worth incenting). 
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question of whether payers can improve health care delivery—be 
attractive to consumers and voters. Whatever the improvements (or 
non-improvements) that the existence of payers can effect with respect 
to health care qua health care, it is important to acknowledge that those 
costs or benefits might not outweigh various systemic concerns 
stakeholders may otherwise find important. 
a. Information 
The age of big data has made scholars, and increasingly 
consumers, concerned about how personal information might be 
gathered, stored, transferred, and used. Medical information is a subset 
of information about which observers are acutely concerned, for 
obvious reasons.201 While anyone can potentially misuse private 
information, some tremble at the idea that the government would have 
their health information in a Medicare for All system, and would thus 
likely be inclined to not choose a public option if available. 
b. Small Government 
A related version of the concern about the government misusing 
information would be a general aversion to an increased government 
role in everyday life. Such may lead, in the minds of some, to a 
passive, dependent populace, lacking the virtues of a citizenry that 
must be more self-reliant.202 Sometimes philosophical objections 
vanish when the bill for fidelity thereto—namely, higher premiums for 
a private plan—is presented, but sometimes they do not. And to the 
extent that there are people willing to pay more to not rely on the 
government and preserve an alternative, one would imagine people 
with such strong preferences will be particularly committed to 
mobilizing in the public sphere.  
 
 201. See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and 
the Future of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 759–61 (2019) (describing risks 
of misuse of genetic and health information of employees); see also Wendy K. 
Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, 18 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975, 978 (2016) (exploring privacy protection from a 
constitutional perspective).  
 202. See, e.g., Mitt Romney Suspends Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/us/politics/08romney-transcript.html 
[https://perma.cc/E9JZ-A7TH] (“Dependency is death to initiative, risk-taking and 
opportunity. Dependency is culture killing. It’s a drug. We’ve got to fight it like the 
poison it is.”). 
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c. Choice 
Choice can be instrumentally valuable to the extent that the 
absence of options frustrates preferences, or because the exercise of 
choice makes more likely that one’s preferences will be satisfied. For 
others, the existence of choice is a virtue in itself. Choice 
acknowledges and promotes through its exercise fundamental truths 
about individuals’ dignity, autonomy, worth, and rights, leading to a 
salutary and robust free society.203 Adherents to this view would thus 
prefer, even if they ended up choosing the public option, a world in 
which that choice was theirs to make. 
V. SKEPTICISM 
I have argued there is little reason to expect payers to add value 
on risk but better reason to believe they could do so on cost and 
quality. In this concluding Part, I consider objections and propose an 
incremental path forward. I again imagine a world where a public 
option exists. 
A skeptic might offer three general objections to the analysis 
offered in Part IV above. First, private actors are inclined to seek rents, 
and therefore what private payers are likely to do—rather than 
innovate in a salutary fashion—is innovate new ways to engage in 
welfare-reducing rent-seeking and profiteering.204 Second, private 
payers have not already engaged in the welfare-enhancing behaviors I 
have proposed, including in a setting in which something resembling 
a public option already exists: Medicare Advantage. There is therefore 
little reason to believe they will do so in the future. Third, the private 
payer best case may be a tiered system of care, which undermines 
social justice.  
A. Avoiding Rent-Seeking 
Payers make money by collecting more money in premiums—
plus investment returns on those premiums—than they pay out in 
claims. And because there are several ways to make money that are 
not welfare-enhancing—cherry-picking healthy insureds, stinting on 
 
 203. See, e.g., DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 16–17 (1997) 
(praising choice as furthering numerous fundamental values). 
 204. See Michael Hiltzik, Health Insurance Companies Are Useless. Get Rid 
of Them, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019, 11:25 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/ 
story/2019-08-05/health-insurance-useless.  
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care, engaging in strategic coverage denials, and so on—keeping 
private payers as a part of the system will mean more of that.  
To be clear, there is significant merit to this criticism. Regulators 
will need to heavily regulate private payers. One cannot set up a 
system, for example, where payers can easily prosper by skimming off 
healthy insureds and collecting community-rated premiums. But the 
good news is that existing regulatory structures, e.g., in the ACA and 
ERISA, do a reasonable enough job in preventing rent-extracting such 
that additional tweaks to combat rent-seeking would be incremental 
rather than monumental.205 
Moreover, the existence of a public option as competition would 
limit some types of classic rent-extraction techniques, e.g., strategic 
denials. Consider what a private payer would face: A public option 
that costs less run by a payer (the government) whose bottom line 
(unlike the private payer) is indifferent to care denials. The private 
payer would need to convince the would-be insured—or, more likely, 
the insured’s employer—that the higher priced coverage option 
offered by the payer was worth it, whether through some proof that its 
denials were no more frequent or unjustified than the government’s or 
some offsetting affirmative advantage of the plan. More generally, the 
public option’s ability to serve as a competitive check on bad private 
payer behavior is a key aspect of its appeal.206  
In sum, to the extent one hopes to leverage private payers as 
forces to generate welfare gains that would be lost if government was 
the sole health care payer, regulators must be mindful of ways in 
which insurers could continue to economically exist by merely 
extracting rents. But that risk seems addressable. 
B. Private Bureaucrats, Not Innovators 
If the above criticism equates to the accusation that one should 
not underestimate how bad payers will be, a related criticism might be 
not to overestimate how good they will be.207 Put differently, it is 
 
 205. This is not to say there will not be opportunities for rent-extraction. It is 
only to say the risk of that is—at least in the short term—a tolerable one given the 
potential advantages of private payer participation. 
 206. I have not focused on that in this Article because—in contrast to how the 
private option might lead to salutary behavior—the bad behavior deterrence argument 
is easier to intuitively understand. Less developed are the hows and whys an option 
might lead to affirmatively better behavior.  
 207. It is true that private payers take significant cues from how Medicare 
behaves. But that is in today’s environment, when Medicare is not truly a competitor. 
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possible that the salutary behaviors I identify will not in fact 
materialize, leaving us simply with a private sector that charges more 
to deliver no additional value.208  
In furtherance of this point, a specific example might be raised: 
Medicare Advantage. Medicare Advantage, so the argument goes, 
currently resembles what I envision throughout. Those eligible for 
Medicare can choose either traditional Medicare or Medicare 
Advantage; with respect to the latter option, private insurers (1) 
provide Medicare benefits (2) plus, if they choose, additional benefits. 
And to the degree that the Medicare Advantage program has suffered 
critiques, so too do my arguments. Like the criticism above, this is 
most certainly an important point—but its consequences in my mind 
favor the use of private payers.  
Medicare Advantage was enacted by Congress in 1997 under a 
different name to “enable the Medicare program to utilize innovations 
that have helped the private market contain costs and expand health 
care delivery options.”209 Since then, the popularity of Medicare 
Advantage plans has steadily grown.210 Part of the appeal of Medicare 
Advantage plans is additional coverage, such as vision and dental, and 
starting in 2019, coverage of benefits—such as social support and 
healthy food—that more broadly promote health.211 That last change 
reflects the insight of scholars who have long urged that “social 
determinants of health” are extremely important to positive health 
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services). 
 209. H.R. REP. NO. 105-217, at 585 (1997), as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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 210. See Gretchen Jacobson, Anthony Damico & Tricia Neuman, Medicare 
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outcomes. While traditional Medicare does not cover such 
interventions, numerous Medicare Advantage plans will.212  
Medicare Advantage plans that offer additional benefits pay for 
those benefits in two ways. First, Medicare Advantage plans, which 
receive a flat fee from the government for each enrollee, are allowed 
to directly charge enrollees an additional premium for additional 
services.213 Second, Medicare Advantage plans use provider networks 
to reduce costs, and thus can, in theory, provide additional benefits 
even without a one-for-one premium raise.214 That trade—more 
benefits in return for slightly higher premiums and the inconvenience 
of a network—will be worth it to some and not others. From a cost 
perspective, the government is indifferent because it pays no more 
than the flat fee. That leaves private payers to experiment with 
packages that (1) strike the right balance between cost and benefit for 
(2) sub-audiences with different preferences. Some do not choose that 
option, and others still disenroll and return to traditional Medicare, 
typically as a result of unhappiness associated with network 
restrictions.215 
But the Medicare Advantage experience illustrates two points 
that cut in favor of private payer participation. First, it confirms the 
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virtues of experimentation from an individual choice perspective; 
namely, that there is good reason to believe that payers will develop 
benefit–cost tradeoffs that will appeal to some set of beneficiaries, 
thus presumably leading to welfare-enhancement compared to the lack 
of that option. Second, it confirms the existence of a demand for 
private alternatives. 
One might counter that the Medicare Advantage shows the limits 
of private payer participation; namely, the ho-hum offer of some 
additional benefits and traditional networks. This argument would 
insist that none of the major innovations suggested in the preceding 
pages of this Article have appeared: no intelligible quality metrics; no 
personalized medicine innovations; no cost-effectiveness constraints. 
To that final (important) point, several rejoinders can be made.  
First, it is not clear that the pressure on private payers has yet 
been significant enough to exhaust the innovation of which they may 
be capable. Medicare Advantage is but a small part of what many 
payers do, and generally early attempts to develop new lines of 
business will leverage existing knowledge about how to attract 
customers and make money. 216 Additional services plus networks is a 
fairly simple application of what payers already know. A public option 
would immediately put under threat retention of a much larger 
percentage of an insurer’s business, i.e., all employment-based group 
insurance and exchange-based insurance that it sells. As a threat (and 
incentive) to the market, Medicare Advantage is marginal, whereas a 
public option for primary coverage strikes at the core of a payer’s 
business. 
Second, the harm of waiting before taking some form of 
regulatory action against private payers seems small: Either private 
payers will innovate in significant ways in the aftermath of a public 
option, or they will not. If they do, their continued participation is 
easily justified. If they do not, the question becomes whether the 
alternative reasons for their involvement—the health care cross-
subsidy, non-health value preferences, as a check against government 
poor performance—are worth the extra financial and regulatory cost 
they impose upon the system. One need not assess those costs and 
benefits now, in the abstract, as opposed to when experience provides 
information and data currently hypothetical.  
Third, to the extent that one believes private payer participation 
is particularly salutary, that might be reason to subsidize their 
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existence even if organic forces do not prompt payers to take the 
initiative themselves. Example one: To the extent one believes private 
payers generate a cross-subsidy that leads to better care overall, a 
series of inducements to either private payers or insureds might be 
justified. Example two: To the extent that certain innovations are 
worthwhile but unlikely to be pursued by private payers without a 
push, the government could take action to promote private 
development of those innovations.217  
C. Tiered Care 
A final objection might target a world in which the arguments 
advanced here are largely right; namely, the potential inequity of a 
system in which private payers do in fact develop ways to deliver a 
better care product than the government. Although sometimes a better 
health care product costs less because wasteful aspects are eliminated, 
generally speaking, better products cost more. That could lead to a 
world where most have the public plan while a wealthier minority gets 
better care. Such a result, the argument goes, would perpetuate the 
very type of inequality that national health insurance is supposed to 
end.218 
While I do not dispute that severe inequality writ large is a 
problem in the United States—and for that matter an unsustainable 
one—I would make two arguments in response. First, the current 
health care system itself is worse than whatever could happen in the 
world this Article conceives. Today millions of people do not have 
health care coverage. If the political cost of a public option is that 
private payers continue to play a meaningful role in American health 
care, virtually any suboptimality occasioned by the continued 
 
 217. For example, to the extent that the creation of a sufficiently 
comprehensive database to permit the widespread implementation of a cost-
effectiveness constraint is too costly or faces a free rider problem, the government 
could offer inducements to those who successfully adopt—and build a paying 
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the insurer. 
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involvement of private payers is worth the gain of truly universal 
coverage. 
Second, given that something like Medicare will be the floor, 
tiered care does not seem particularly unpalatable. Capitalism has 
virtues and vices; the former leads to a larger pie and the latter to 
unequal slices. If the existence of private payers results in a segment 
of the market paying medical providers more—even if the “more” is 
likely an overpayment—to the extent a society is going to overpay 
anyone, best that we overpay the sector capable of restoring 
capabilities and extending life. Whatever else is reducible to fungible 
bits in the information age, those two things are not.  
CONCLUSION 
Whatever its tolerance for market interventions, the American 
polity has long been and remains skeptical of the direct government 
provision of goods, as well as the elimination of choice. Those two 
preferences and the inclination to punish politicians who ignore them 
might constitute good political reason enough to not instantiate a 
“Medicare for All” approach. But policy might also counsel against 
“Medicare for All,” and instead in favor of some form of a public 
option—a piece of policy that last great spasm of American health 
reform, the still-controversial Affordable Care Act, rejected.  
There is reason to believe that private payers can serve welfare-
enhancing functions with respect to cost and quality, and those 
possibilities seem more likely to obtain where the public option 
provides competitive pressure. At a minimum, payers should be given 
time to prove themselves on that score, and their value proposition is 
not so fragile as to suggest that no consumers will be interested in the 
“private option.” To the extent that private payers fall comparatively 
short, there could still be good reason to preserve a system with both 
public and private payers, and to perhaps even offer carrots to the 
latter. Even absent a persuasive argument in favor of private payers 
contributing to improved health care delivery, non-health value 
preferences might justify the continued role of private payers, 
particularly if a significant percentage of Americans are willing to pay 
for those values. Given those various possibilities—the contours of 
which are only likely to become clear after some period of 
experimentation, trial, and error—the prudent course appears to be the 
incremental one: public and private options both. 
